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Eastern Europe has been the infant terrible of international
politics in the modern era. Conflict within and about this re-
gion has precipitated two devastating world wars and continues to
threaten the stability of the international system. In the post-
war era, the Soviet Union has exerted its dominance in Eastern
Europe in a manner which the Tsars would have surely envied. It
is this dominance and the instruments through which it is
achieved, that this paper is concerned.
Born of the East-West Cold War struggle, the Warsaw Pact has
evolved to symbolize the calculated Soviet subjugation of Eastern
Europe in the political and military spheres. This unwanted
partnership, imposed by the Soviets on their reluctant allies,
is far from the alliance Soviet spokesmen would claim. It is
rather an instrument of a much broader integrationist program
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One should know one's enemies, their
alliances, their resources and nature
of their country, in order to plan a
campaign.
— Frederick the Great
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I. INTRODUCTION
The geo-political mise-en-scene of Eastern Europe has had
wide ranging implications for international stability throughout
history. The bifurcated nature of today's European system is a
result of a continuing struggle for political, social and economic
order. Given the historic significance and the present and future
implications of this process in Eastern Europe, it would be rea-
sonable to focus on any number of issues in the East European
arena. Specifically, it is my intention to focus on the military-
political relationship between the Soviet Union and the Communist
States of Eastern Europe as personified in the structure and func-
tion of Soviet policy in the Warsaw Pact.
If we are to use this or any other analysis as a tool to ex-
plain or predict Soviet policy in the Warsaw Pact, then we must
first seek to acquire the "proper" perspective. I have enclosed
the following vignette to illustrate the significance of an ob-
server's orientation in analyzing a situation:
When a lawyer in Illinois, Abraham Lincoln was in-
volved in cross examining a witness on his perceptions
of an event:
"How many legs does a cow have?" asked Lincoln.
"Four."
"If you called the cow's tail a fifth leg, then
how many legs would a cow have."
"Five," said the witness.
"Wrong," replied Lincoln, "Whatever you call it,
it's still a tail to the cow."
A major problem in attempting to analyze Soviet policy in the
Warsaw Pact or elsewhere is that too many V7estern observers are

calling the tail a leg. The Soviet view is somehow easily dis-
carded in favor of a strictly Western orientation. Therefore,
any reasonable study of Soviet policy must view the issues
equally in a Western and Soviet framework. Such an orientation
will help to clarify the evolution of Soviet policy in the War-
saw Pact in terms of much broader Soviet goals and objectives.
To couch our analysis of the Pact in strictly Western terms
would/ I believe, skew our understanding of Soviet methods.
The Soviet view is in reality a curious mix of Communist
theology and Imperial Russian culture. Its orientation is based
on a complex set of Marxist-Leninist principles which disguise
a heritage of harsh social, economic and political realities. The
Soviet view rejects the enlightened philosophy, democracy and
individualism of the Western experience and em.braces the xeno-
phobia, anti-intellectualism and anti-democratic traditions of
old Moscow. The unique cultural milieu of the peasant village
and the Tsarist court were not swept aside by revolution, but
continued in a new form. Authority remained absolute and
centralized. Individual rights and democratic processes were
not internalized. The new leadership regarded only self-preserva-
tion as the social and political norm. Though the forms of
Imperial Russia were cast aside in violent upheaval, its sub-
stance remained intact. It is therefore absolutely essential to
understanding the Soviet view to recognize that the patterns of
old Russia which persists in the Soviet system today.

Historic, geographic and cultural factors alone would be
sufficient to legitimize the subjugation of Eastern Europe in the
Soviet mind. Russian interests in this area are rooted in sev-
eral hundred years of political, social and economic interaction.
The northern plain of T^astern Europe (and in particular Poland) ,
has been the traditional invasion corridor from the West to
Russia. Catholic Poland had been the ancient enemy of Orthodox
Russia, and the two waged wars over the centuries, with Poland
generally having the upper hand from the fifteenth to the seven-
teenth centuries. Four great attempts to conquer Russia came
from or through Poland: the Polish capture of the Kremlin in
1610; the invasion by Sweden's King Charles XII in 1709; the
invasion of Napoloen's Grand Army in 1812; and Hitler's invasion
in 1941. Russia has traditionally viewed the existence of a
strong, independent neighbor as a threat to her security. Thus,
she has played a role in the several major partitions of Poland:
in 1772; 1793; 1795; and 1939. [1] It is against this historic
tradition that the Soviet mind links Russian security to the
East European Communist States which compose the northern tier
of the Warsaw Pact.
The Balkan Peninsula, as a result of the centuries-long
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was and remains one of the great-
est sources of international conflict in the modern era. The
"Eastern Question" engendered on the one hand by the crisis of
the Ottoman Empire, and on the other by increased colonial ex-
pansion into the Near East, was marked by several distinct
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periods. The first phase covered the period from the end of
the eighteenth century to the Crimean War, and was marked pri-
marily by the dominant role played by the Russian Empire in
securing a foothold in the Near East and a right of access to
the Black Sea. Despite the expansionist objectives the Tsar
pursued with respect to the Ottoman Empire, the victories won
over the Turks by Russian armed forces in this period had con-
sequences that were historically progressive, inasmuch as this
process established a number of independent states in the Balkans
Russia's expansionist interests soon collided with the
similar interests of the other great European powers. In this
second period of the "Eastern Question", which opened with the
Crimean War of 1853-1856 and closed with the end of the nine-
teenth century. Great Britain, France and Austria-Hungary in-
creased their interest in the Ottoman Empire as a source of raw
materials and as a market for industrial goods. These imperial
policies of the Western European countries, which took from
Turkey its border territories, were camouflaged by the principles
of preserving the "status quo", the "integrity" of the Ottoman
Empire, and the "balance of power" in Europe, but had as their
goal the diminuation of Russian influence in the area and the
closing of the Black Sea Straits to Russian warships. In this
middle phase, the desires of Austria-Hungary to achieve economic
and political hegemony in the Balkan region crossed the expan-




The third phase of the "Eastern Question" was marked by
Germany's impetuous expansion into the Near East, with the inten-
tion of squeezing out the other great powers. The building of
the Baghdad Railroad and the subordination of Turkish ruling
circles to the military and political influence of Germany
brought the Kaiser to predominance in an area already froth
with tension. The increased conflict over the "Eastern Question"
during the final era of European Imperialism was occasioned by
the further decline of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the
growth and diffusion of national liberation movements among
the peoples subject to the rule of the Turkish Sultan. [2] In
this phase of the "Eastern Question", the stage was set for the
events of the early twentieth century which led to the Great
War in Europe and eventually to the birth of the Soviet State.
In a very general sense, Soviet policy in the Warsaw Pact may
be seen as a permanent solution to the "Eastern Question" in
which Russia has realized some of its earliest aspirations. At
the very least, these north/south concerns of Imperial Russia,
which led to a bifurcated policy with regards to Eastern Europe,
may be the underlying framework which translated into a similarly
divided Soviet policy in the Warsaw Pact. Over the past twenty-
five years, the Soviet Union has taken a markedly different view
of events in the Northern tier (composed of East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia) as opposed to similar events in the Southern




Before moving directly to the details of Soviet policy in
the Warsaw Pact, it will be important to our understanding of
that policy to indulge in a brief measure of postwar Soviet
military doctrine. There are four points I should like to
entertain. First, Marxism/Leninism casts international relations
in terms of the dialectic, and therefore as inevitably conflictual
Familiar static concepts (such as "status quo" and "coexistence"),
are not really part of the Marxist vocabulary. Thus, the Soviet
Union has always taken the possibility of war with the West very
seriously and while its assessment as to the likelihood of this
inevitable conflict has varied over time, the Soviet leadership
has never wavered in its belief that a strong military capability
was necessary.
The second point is that Soviet military doctrine does not
separate the idea of "nuclear deterrence" from the more general
concept of defense. The defense of the Soviet Union rests upon
the capability to repel, or at least, to absorb any attack and
then go on to win the subsequent war. The Soviets obviously
hope that their military capability will dissuade any aggressor,
which is of course deterrence in its traditional sense. How-
ever, the crucial distinction between this and the Western con-
cept of strategic deterrence is that should war come, Soviet
deterrence will only have failed if their armed forces are
unable to recover and go on to final victory. The Soviets do
not entertain the notion that if war breaks out, then deterrence
has necessarily failed. The emphasis on defense through a
13

war-fighting capability therefore is central to Soviet military
doctrine.
Third, a readiness to think through the implications of a
nuclear war does not imply that the Soviet Union would recklessly
embark on such a war with the West. Marxist/Leninist theory
instructs that the initiation of war as a deliberate policy can
only be justified if: (a) victory is virtually certain; and
(b) the gains clearly outweigh the losses. In a major war with
the Western powers, defeat for the Soviet Union would be synony-
mous with the extinction of the socialist system. It is the
catastrophic consequences of defeat which motivates the Soviet
Union to achieve higher levels of readiness and military super-
iority despite the rather contrived nature of the "capitalist
threat"
.
Lastly, Soviet military doctrine is based on two important
sets of objectives. The first focuses on extirpating the
capitalist system by such measures as destroying its forces,
its war-making potential, and its political structure. The
second set focuses on preserving the socialist system which,
besides protecting the socialist structure of government, must
also aim to secure a sufficient economic base from which to
build the world socialist order. The implications of these
dual sets of objectives directly bear on Soviet force levels,
inventories, military strategy, and tactics. Most important,
this rather loose outline of Soviet military doctrine repre-
sents a continuity of thought and purpose which spans the
14

Ipostwar period with the exception of the short but significant
wiggle introduced by Khrushchev in the early 1960 's. [3]
The Soviet view of international relations, and particularly
alliances, is thus a complex product of their past, present,
and importantly, their future. Their belief in the dynamic
nature of reality and in the inevitable outcome of natural
poltical processes has placed the Soviet mind in an ideological
bondage. This intellectual inflexibility causes them to per-
ceive things as they should be and not as they are. The social,
M political, and economic realities of Eastern Europe are viewed
in this peculiar manner. Their policy in regards to the Warsaw
T Pact is thus defined in terms of a socialist utopia which, though
not fully operational, will nevertheless be realized. This in-
consistency is translated into actions which often defy Western
understanding. Without a thorough understanding of Russian
culture, Russian/East European history, and Marxist/Leninist
theology, we are easily led to simplistic solutions and ex-
planations which "mirror-image" our own experiences and perspec-
tives. This introduction has been designed, at the very least,
to make the reader aware of these pitfalls when attempting to
understand Soviet policy in any sphere.
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II. BACKGROUND, ORIGIN AND EARLY STRUCTURE
OF THE WARSAW PACT
A. BACKGROUND
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
which emerged after the Second World War was shaped by the com-
plex factors discussed briefly in the introductory chapter.
History, geography, culture, religion and ideology have, as sug-
gested, played a role in shaping both the direction and config-
uration of this relationship. These factors, however, have
impacted Soviet relations with the individual countries of
Eastern Europe in uneven and changing proportions, contributing
to the discontinuities evident in Soviet policies and actions
throughout the postwar period. Some of these factors have
served to bind the countries of Eastern Europe to the Soviet
Union while others have served to alienate them. Indeed, while
history and geography alone may sufficiently explain the sub-
jugation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union after World War
II, the specific character and form of the subjugation suggests
that other factors have been equally influential. Soviet-East
European relations owe part of their character to the broader
history of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) and the World Communist movement, of which the




The history of Soviet relationships, first with foreign
Communist parties, then with Communist states, and then with
rivals for leadership (China) , has been determined by two
contradictory purposes: (1) serving the interests of the world
socialist movement; or (2) serving the State interests of the
Soviet Union. The first purpose is essentially self-abnegative,
since it demands that the interests of the Soviet State be sub-
ordinated to extranational interests, while the second subverts
socialist internationalism. Inevitably, tensions between these
two conflicting purposes were difficult to resolve. Either the
Soviet State was to become an expendable instrument of the inter-
national proletariat, or the Communist movement would be reduced
to a creature responsive to the demands of the Soviet State.
This dilemma was not surprisingly resolved by adjusting the
interests of the movement and foreign Communist parties to those
of the Soviet Union. Thus from 192 8 to 1953, under Stalin,
foreign Communist parties, even after assuming power in their
own countries, remained instruments of Soviet control. [1]
With the installation of Communist regimes in the countries
of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was forced to share the
Socialist spotlight. The Soviet Union could no longer claim to
articulate the class interests of the world proletariat languish-
ing in oppression and exploitation in capitalist countries. As
long as the Soviet Union was the sole Communist State, it could
rationalize that, as the only country ruled by the proletariat,
class interests dictated highest loyalty to the base and center
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of the world revolutionary movement. This loyalty was not
founded on the inherent moral superiority or the priority of
interests of the Soviet proletariat, but was simply a function
of historical fortuity. This universal loyalty was dubbed
"proletarian internationalism" and was based on the pretense
that the Soviet Union was the main representative of the class
interests of proletarians in all countries.
Proletarian internationalism set the tone for the relation-
ships that developed between the Soviet Union and the "liberated"
countries of Eastern Europe in the postwar period. It became, in
effect, a device for converting party subservience into state
vassalage. The East European countries were subjugated and their
interests were subordinated to those of their Russian mentors.
Some satellite leaders, however, rejected the Stalinist theory
of "international proletarianism" and interpreted it as applic-
able only to parties in capitalist countries, noting that, other-
wise it became a philosophical justification for Soviet
colonialism. [2] The refusal of Yugoslavia's Tito among other
anti-Stalinist East European leaders to place the interests of
the Soviet State above those of their own countries, and to act
as subservient agents in the face of Moscow's economic plunder
and exploitation, resulted in Tito's expulsion and the whole-
sale liquidation of the other dissident leaders. Tito's defec-
tion in 1948-1949 marks the birth of "national Communism" and




Among the immediate consequences of World War II, which
significantly shaped the postwar international environment, was
the penetration of Soviet military power into Eastern Europe.
As Stalin said in April, 1945, "This war is not as in the past;
whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social
system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his
army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." [3] In the postwar
period, as the Soviet Union consolidated its share of the victory
over Germany, it became apparent that this prescription was in-
deed put to work. Besides the task of securing the Soviet posi-
tion in occupied Germany, the Soviet armed forces were used to
secure other parts of Eastern Europe in preparation for their
subsequent forced entry into the world socialist order. Un-
fortunately, at war's end, the Western Allies were in no mood
to contemplate dislodging the Soviet forces, and for all prac-
tical purposes, acquiesced early in the period to Soviet hege-
mony in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Allies had largely
demobilized their wartime forces within the first year or so
after the war.
As early as the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Western
Allies apparently gave Stalin the impression that he would have
a free hand in Eastern Europe. This notion was later reinforced
by Churchill's celebrated "spheres of influence" conversation
with Stalin in October 1944. There is still a great deal of
ambiguity, which competing interpretations have not resolved,
as to the extent which the West, during the war, accepted a
future Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. [4]
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In the fullness of time, history may provide answers to
all the problems it poses, but it does not reveal much about
the possible outcome of lost opportunities. One such lost
opportunity was doubtless the failure of the Soviet Union and
the West to establish a mutually acceptable relationship in the
postwar period. If there is little point in speculating on
what might have been, it is appropriate to note that in the
first several years after World War II, Stalin chose a policy
which not only prejudiced the possibility of postwar collabora-
tion with the Western Allies, but which also served to unite
them in opposition to his aims. Certainly Western attitudes and
statesmanship also contributed to the breakdown of wartime unity,
which helped give rise to what became the Cold War, but to recog-
nize this is not embrace the notion that Stalin stands in the
eyes of history as the injured party.
Given the rapid demobilization of Western forces immediately
following the war, it would seem that relatively modest Soviet
forces would have been sufficient to safeguard Soviet gains and
to shield the processes of socialism in Eastern Europe. However,
Stalin chose to keep very substantial forces in place in occupied
Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Numbering close to
thirty divisions and nearly a half-million men, this Soviet force
loomed formidably against the fewer than ten loosely coordinated
British, French and American divisions that garrisoned Western
Europe in those early years (1945-1948) . It was the visible
Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, backed by
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substantial forces in the bordering territory of the USSR
itself/ which initially gave rise to serious concern in the
West that this "imbalance of forces" might prejudice the post-
war security of Europe. [5J
Many interpretations of Stalin's motives have been offered,
and most tend to fall into two categories: (1) those stressing
his desire to exploit the postwar situation in order to make
positive gains for Soviet policy; and (2) those emphasizing
his concerns for Soviet security. In the first case, it is held
that Stalin, sensing that the floodgates of social and political
upheaval opened by the defeat of Germany would not remain open
forever, decided to make the most of this opportunity to advance
the revolution, even at the cost of alienating his wartime allies
The collapse of Germany had left a power vacuum in the heart of
Europe which Stalin was cynically prepared to fill, the main
restriction upon his aggressive urge being "the limits of an
amiable indulgence of the Western powers". In the second
category, by contrast, Stalin is said to have been primarily
concerned with fending off anticipated efforts by the Western
powers to undo his wartime gains and therefore sought to fore-
stall them by consolidating Soviet control over the territories
occupied by the Red Army. Certainly these, as well as other
elements entered into Stalin's postwar perceptions of the East
European scene, as he seemed "bent upon squandering the reser-
voir of good will" he had inherited from the wartime years. It
is unclear whether his expansionist aims were disguised as
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security guarantees or that, in fact, he understood there to be
little difference between the extension of Communist rule and
the enhancement of Soviet security. In any case, without be-
laboring all the possible sources of Stalin's motivation, it is
clear that Soviet security and Soviet expansion had some bearing
upon his policy toward Eastern Europe in this period. [6]
In 1945, the defeat of Germany had left the Soviet Union
virtually unchallenged in Eastern Europe, where it was Stalin's
task to translate the Soviet Union's new position of influence
into practical political arrangements. In Stalin's view,
"friendly" East European states bordering the Soviet Union were
necessary to ensure a "fundamental" security for the Soviet
State, and only countries with Communist regimes could be regarded
as safe and dependable friends. Whether he envisaged East Europe
as part of a Soviet-dominated interstate system, or its absorp-
tion into the Soviet State itself is not clear, he was apparently
satisfied to allow the neighboring Communist states to remain
outside the federative framework of the Soviet Union, unlike his
previous treatment of the Baltic States. During the first
several years after the war he was content to gradually close off
Eastern Europe from Western influence and to set in motion a
transitional stage of takeover. This transitional policy,
favored by Stalin, was marked by such measures as exacting
economic reparations, the establishment of mixed-stock com-
panies favoring Soviet economic penetration of the region, and
the installation of a legal basis for the "liquidation of
22

political opposition" through the formation of "constitutional"
regimes known as "People's Democracies".
The turning point of Stalin's postwar policy in Eastern
Europe came in 1947, coincident with the founding of the
Cominform and the launching of the "Zhdanovshchnia, " when the
transitional process of Sovietization of the East European
countries was greatly speeded up. At this time, emphasis was
laid upon the "debt" of Eastern Europe to the "liberating"
armies of the Soviet Union to which the Communist regimes owed
their existence. However, despite the pressures of Stalin's
attempt at political coordination in Eastern Europe, this harsher
phase of Soviet policy (the Zhdanovshchina) tended to create
its own liabilities. Nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe
were reawakened by the obtrusive character of Russian control.
A sense of East European regionalism found expression in such
proposals as Tito's for a closer bond between Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria, with its implication of a wider East European
federation. Stalin's well-known effort to bring Tito into line
collapsed in 1948, but he was somewhat more successful in supres-
sing "polycentric" tendencies in the other satellite regimes by
purging the leaderships. (Patrascana of Rumania, Gomulka of
Poland, Rajk of Hungary, dementis of Czechoslovakia, and Rostov
of Bulgaria)
.
Paralleling Stalin's tightening of political control in
Eastern Europe and his elimination of deviationist elites among
the various national party cadres was the initiation of a new
23

program to institutionalize Soviet influence in the economic
sphere. This took the form of the establishment in 1949 of the
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, (CEMA or Comecon) , and
although presumably intended to provide for the bloc-wide pool-
ing of resources and the division of labor integrated with Soviet
economic plans, it functioned less as an instrument of economic
integration than as a device for conducting an economic boycott
of Yugoslavia. [7] For the most part, Stalin preferred to con-
tinue direct "bilateral" economic relations with the various
satellite countries.
Similarly, in the sphere of security arrangements with the
East European satellites, Stalin preferred to keep things on a
bilateral basis. Beginning in 194 8, the Soviets concluded a
series of bilateral treaties with several East European coun-
tries, pledging mutual assistance in the event of "aggression
from without." These treaties were followed by a number of
similar bilateral arrangements among the states of Eastern
Europe themselves (see Appendix B) . With respect to the armed
forces of the East European satellites, Stalin's policy in the
early years was aimed largely at eliminating personnel whose
loyalties were suspect, and only much later did he begin to
give attention to building up the military capabilities of the
satellite forces.
On the whole, Stalin's policy toward Eastern Europe between
1945 and 1953 could be judged a good deal more successful than
Soviet policy toward Western Europe in the same period. However,
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not far beneath the surface, issues and forces were stirring
with which the methods of Stalinism were to prove inadequate to
cope after Stalin himself was gone. National pride, popular
resentment toward Soviet economic exploitation, fears among
party cadres for their personal security and dissatisfaction
with the degeneration of "party life" , and a growing doubt that
doctrinaire Soviet methods and Soviet experience were relevant
models for the societies of Eastern Europe -- these among other
factors combined to generate mounting pressure against the lid
which Stalin had clamped down upon the life of Eastern Europe.
These smoldering problems of Eastern Europe ignited during the
early years of the Warsaw Pact.
Of all the aspects of Stalin's policies which contributed
to keeping Cold War anxieties alive, it was Stalin's latter-days
approach to the question of Germany which proved to be least
reassuring. Though Stalin's thinking by this time had backed
away somewhat from the "two hostile camps" concept of the
"Zhdanovshchina," his post 1948 approach to the German question
did little to convey a benign image of Soviet intentions. Rather,
it came to be seen as the prescription for a policy aimed at
provoking discord among the Western countries who had welcomed
a defeated Germany into their midst. [8] That Germany should
be very much at the center of Soviet thinking was not surpris-
ing, the prospect of German recovery and the direction in which
a resurgent Germany might turn its energies could scarcely fail
to be of concern to them. Therefore, there is no reason to
25

suppose that Stalin took lightly the possibility that Germany
might prove to be the catalyst of a new war into which the Soviet
Union could be drawn. Perhaps Stalin believed that the trouble-
making potential of a resurgent Germany could be turned against
the West by an adroit Soviet diplomacy or, alternatively, he may
have counted upon finding an approach to the German question
which would neutralize Germany and perhaps give the Soviet Union
a controlling hand in German affairs.
That Stalin may even have been prepared to reverse an
earlier preference for a divided Germany in order to find a more
plausible solution to the German problem is suggested by the
controversial Soviet proposal of March 195 3. In this proposal,
Stalin dropped his previous insistence on a totally disarmed
Germany, and raised the prospect of unification in return for
German neutralization and the liquidation of foreign military
bases on German soil. Some seven months of diplomatic maneuver-
ing between Moscow and the West followed the Soviet overture,
with the West accusing the Soviet government of dodging the
question of free elections, while the Soviets charged that the
issue of free elections was only intended to divert discussion
from the substantive issues of the Soviet proposal. Ultimately,
the result was that the West declined to negotiate, tending to
regard Stalin's proposal primarily as a maneuver or "delaying
bid" to forestall the ratification of the European Defense
26

2Community (EDC) . Although this view was challenged by some
Western critics, and labeled as a "lost opportunity", there is
every reason to believe that Stalin was seeking a tactical
device to delay, or if possible forestall, implementation of
the EDC, under which West Germany would have taken a first major
step toward participation in the Western defense system. That
Stalin may have been prepared to bargain seriously over German
reunification is by no means incompatible with his notion of a
unified Germany drawn politically into the Soviet orbit. On
2The European Defense Community (EDC) was an abortive
attempt by the West European powers to form a supranational
European army. The idea was originally rooted at the Hague
Conference of 1948. Later, Rene Pleven, twice the French
Premier, evolved a plan that was put forward by French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman at a meeting of the Council of Europe
in 1951. Under the EDC concept, a united West Europe would
form a wholly integrated armed force to counterbalance the
overwhelming conventional military ascendancy of the Soviet
Union. The EDC Treaty was concluded in Paris in 1954.
Though the French were divided on the EDC issue, they
were attracted by the idea of diluting West Germany's future
military potential through such a supranational arrangement.
Those Frenchmen who favored the EDC realized that Great
Britain would also have to join, otherwise the dispersal of
French armed forces in Indochina and North Africa would have
implied German ascendancy within the force. Britain, however,
as a result of its lingering isolationism, was reluctant to
sacrifice British sovereignty to European integration. Never-
theless, when it was clear that the EDC would not be ratified
by the French National Assembly (August, 1954), Britain's
Anthony Eden took the lead to rectify the situation by calling
for a nine-power conference at which he put forward a con-
siderably modified scheme involving a higher degree of coop-
eration between separate national armies under the Brussels
Treaty Council. Consequently, A Western European Unity Treaty
(.of 50 years term) was signed, and the Western European Union
(WEU) was set up in 1955. Military cooperation, however,
continued to be coordinated primarily within the NATO organiza-
tion, to which West Germany was admitted in 1955, providing
the raison-de-etre for the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
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the other hand, the fact that a new forced-draft program for
the "construction of socialism" in East Germany was adopted in
July 1952, even though an exchange of notes on Stalin's March
proposal was still underway, may indicate that Stalin had never
really expected his reunification offer to bear fruit. The
burden of any criticism, (similar criticism was extended to the
Western reaction to Soviet negotiating initiatives in 1954 and
1955 when the Paris agreements involving West Germany's partic-
ipation in NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) were wait-
ing ratification) , comes down to the point that, since the West
failed to test Stalin's proposal through the negotiations, it
must remain a question whether any real "opportunity" for resolv-
ing German unification was lost. [9]
The era of Stalinist hegemony — lasting until the mid-
1950 's — was characterized by a certain simplicity, in that the
Soviet Union issued instructions and directions to the leaders
of Eastern Europe, who, in turn, implemented them. The satel-
lites diligently took their cues from Moscow, so that differences
between Soviet and Eastern European political patterns and
priorities were not a matter of substance. The only exception
was Yugoslavia's Tito, who, as a result of his independent
national political course, was condemned as a deviationist. The
Stalinist phase in Soviet-East European relations was an era of
Soviet triumph as the Soviet Union demonstrated the utility and
applicability of its own model of socialism. It was an era of
military promise because the Soviet Union had fulfilled its
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historic ambition by erecting a buffer zone on its western
frontiers. Finally, the Stalinist phase in Eastern Europe
offered economic benefits to the Soviet Union in the form of
extensive reparations and through imposed and eminently unfair
trade agreements
.
On the other hand, the events of the postwar Stalin period
demonstrated that this approach was too domineering to serve
Soviet interests. The "anti-Tito" purges instilled widespread
fear and left a residue of considerable elite tensions. The
imposition of collectivization resulted in an agricultural
crisis throughout the region, and the exploitation of the East
European economies proved to be counterproductive. The East
Berlin riots of 1953, the dramatic Polish events in 1956, and
especially the Hungarian revolt of that same year, clearly sug-
gested to the Soviet leadership that Stalin's conception of
Soviet-East European relations had to give way to a less
imperious relationship.
When Stalin died in March, 1953, his successors could not
have failed to realize that the satellites were becoming
increasingly political, economic and military burdens as much
as assets. [10] Their first task was clearly to get the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe moving again under appropriate Soviet
direction, with some reasonable degree of coordination of
policies in foreign and domestic affairs. However, the new
leadership was quickly embroiled in a succession crisis which
unleashed internal divisions within the Kremlin, which, in turn.
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created opportunities for self-expression among the vassal
states. The more inconclusive the struggle in Moscow, the
greater the apprehension in Eastern Europe. Surviving anti-
Stalinists in satellite countries were emboldened to surface and
to directly challenge the system. Soviet-modeled institutions
were, in many ways, dissolved or modified, while Soviet-type
ideological controls over the arts, sciences and media were
renounced in accordance with local demands, even the Cominform
itself was abolished in response to these demands. [11]
As the succession controversy became more acute, Kremlin
factions reached out into their East European empire for incre-
mental support. The divisive and corrosive factional squabbles
in the Kremlin all combined to undermine Soviet prestige and
authority in the socialist sphere. The uncertainty and hesita-
tion in Moscow in the wake of Stalin's death encouraged arrogance
in Peking, insolence in Belgrade, and dissidence in Eastern
Europe. Against this backdrop of internal intrigue, external
dissent, and extreme East-West tensions, the Warsaw Pact emerged
as an instrument of post-Stalin Soviet policy.
B. ORIGIN
On the whole, Stalin's passing did not basically affect the
priority he had assigned to the development of Soviet economic
and military power, nor did it change the Soviet Union's Cold
War objectives in Europe with respect to the neutralization
of Germany and the blocking of a further buildup of Western
defenses. His demise did, however, open the way for innovations
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in the style and manner by which these objectives were to be
pursued. There is no universal agreement with the view
that Stalin's death caused only a "shift in factors" leading to
the employment of more subtle and flexible means of control
throughout the Soviet empire. Suffice it to say that, while
deep-seated forces of change may have been awakened in Soviet
society by Stalin's passing, the post-Stalin leadership was more
concerned with new tactics relative to Stalin's old objectives. [12]
Some signs of a new flexibility in the conduct of Soviet
policy began to appear even before the transitional succession
struggle was resolved in Nikita Khrushchev's favor. In a series
of proposals in 1954 and early 1955, various alternative plans
for an all-European collective security system were linked with
suggestions for a settlement of the German question. The first
set of these proposals was advanced by Molotov at the Council of
Foreign Ministers Conference at Berlin in January-February 1954,
which had been convened to deal with the question of peace
treaties for Germany and Austria. He proposed a collective
security system embracing both West and East European states,
but which tentatively excluded the United States and the PRC.
On the German question, Molotov proposed that German unification
be effected under a coalition government giving equal status
to the Bonn government and to the East German Communist regime.
Like the earlier meetings of the Council of Ministers in Stalin's
3day, this conference ended without East-West agreement.
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In the months that followed this fruitless meeting, while
the EDC treaty debate raged in West European capitals, Soviet
diplomacy offered several modified proposals linking a German
peace settlement with a conference on European security. One
of these, offered in a Soviet note of March 31, 1954, suggested
that NATO be widened to include the Soviet Union and the East
European Communist states. The West's refusal to act on this
proposal was later taken as proof of NATO's aggressive military
posture. The rejection of the EDC treaty by the French Assembly
in August 1954 brought momentary satisfaction in Moscow, however,
the speedy conclusion of the Paris Agreements less than two
months later, which were taken to surmount the French failure to
ratify the EDC, renewed Soviet anxiety over West German partic-
ipation in Western defense arrangements. Since the Paris accords
of October 1954 were not to go into effect until May 1955, Soviet
diplomacy devoted itself in the interim to discourage their
implementation. Soviet efforts took many forms, including
threats to abrogate the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties
of 1942 and 1944, and a new series of proposals for conferences
on collective security and German reunification. The first of
3The last notable attempt during Stalin's regime to reach
a treaty settlement on Germany in these joint negotiations was
in June, 1949 at the sixth session of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in Paris. When Vysninskii sought to restore the
principle of four-power control over the whole of Germany. [13]
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these proposals, calling in October 1954 for a four power con-
ference in the following month on German reunification and the
creation of a collective security system, was quickly followed
by other similar proposals in November and December, 19 54, and
January and February, 1955. In a note directed against the
ratification of the Paris Agreements, sent on November 13, 1954
to the governments of the other twenty three European States
and to the United States, the Soviets condemned the ressurec-
tion of German militarism and warned that German unity would
be sacrificed by including West Germany in the Western security
system.
"The plans drawn up at the London and Paris Conferences
for the ressurecting of Germ.an militarism and incorporat-
ing the remilitarized Germany in military alignments
cannot but complicate the situation in Europe ... It
will therefore be natural if the peace-loving European
nations find themselves obliged to adopt new measures
for safeguarding their security." [14]
In late November, 1954, the Soviets convened a "European Security
Conference" in Moscow which was attended only by countries of the
socialist bloc, and announced at the close of the conference on
December 2, 1954, that the bloc would "take common measures for
the organization of armed forces and their commands" in the event
the Western powers ratified the Paris Agreements. Most signif-
icantly, in its last-ditch campaign against the Paris Agreements,
the Soviet Union shifted its position on the vexing issue of
German elections, indicating that it was prepared to discuss the
"holding of free all-German elections" providing the West would
refrain from ratifying the Paris Agreements. Thus, as in Stalin's
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March, 1952 reunification proposal, the Soviet Union again called
for the West to abandon its NATO concept of common defense as
the price for a peace treaty that would settle the future status
of Germany.
Despite Soviet pronouncements and proposals, the West declined
to dismantle its security structure and went ahead with the Paris
Agreements, ratifying them on May 5, 1955. Despite this major
setback, which certainly contributed to Bulganin's demise, Soviet
diplomacy in Europe took several new paths under the emergent
4leadership of Khrushchev.
It soon became apparent that Khrushchev's ebullient style
was bringing a new vigor to the conduct of Soviet diplomacy when
in the spring of 1955 the Soviet Union injected a fresh note
into the European policy approach by reviving the long-stalled
talks on Austria. The relative ease of these negotiations
came as a pleasant surprise to Western participants, and the
successful conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15,
19 55 sparked new hopes for detente in Europe. Under the terms
of the treaty, the Soviet Union, in return for Austrian neutrality.
4At which point in time Khrushchev achieved dominance over
Soviet foreign policy is not clear. He was probably well on
the way toward it by the end of 1954, when he turned up in
Peking as the Soviet leader to deal with Mao Tse Tung on the
already delicate issue of Sino-Soviet relations. He probably
did not gain undisputed control of Soviet foreign and domestic
polity, until he had eliminated the so-called "anti-party
group" in mid 1957. [15]
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gave up its forward military position in Central Europe, agree-
ing to withdraw its troops from Austrian territory. However,
by giving up its occupied portion of Austria, the Soviet Union
had created a 500 mile neutral wedge, splitting the Western
defense area in two. As one astute observer put it, "What the
Paris Agreements had joined: together , " not six months before,
"the State Treaty, at least partly, put asunder." [16]
Simultaneously with the Austrian Treaty, however, the Soviet
Union made another move which took the edge off any optimistic
expectations rising in Europe. In an avowed response to West
Germany's entry into NATO, (which occurred May 9, 1955), the
Soviets annulled their treaties with Britain and France, and on
May 11, 1955 convened the Conference for the Protection of Peace
and the Security of Europe in Moscow. Three days later on May
14, 1955, just one day before signing the Austrian State Treaty,
the Soviet Union and its East European satellites signed a pact
creating the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) . This step marked
the emergence of rival military alliance systems in postwar
Europe. Although the Warsaw Treaty was at its inception largely
a diplomatic countermeasure which brought little immediate change
in the military or political condition of the Eastern bloc, it
did have the incidental effect of providing a new legal basis
for the preservation of Soviet military forces in Hungary and
Rumania. Closely modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty, Soviet
leaders considered the Warsaw Pact an alliance on an equal foot-
ing with NATO, accruing useful advantages for the Soviets in
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the United Nations as well as in other negotiating forums.
Apart from the German issue, the continuing struggle among
Stalin's successors had wide repercussions for the Warsaw Pact.
Much of the succession conflict had centered on differing views
of the "correct" foreign policy. Within the Soviet Politburo,
Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov and Voroshilov had been opposed
to Malenkov. During his premiership, Malenkov had attempted to
moderate Stalin's hard-line committing himself to detente and
to the prevention of nuclear war. The anti-Malenkov group,
however, viewed steps to reduce international tensions with
suspicion, and considered the struggle to isolate capitalism
more important than detente. Ultimately, though, it was the
failure of Malenkov 's deomstic program which prompted his
resignation in February, 1955. Having gained control of the
leadership, Bulganin and Khrushchev moved further away from
Stalin's hard-line approach to foreign relations, thereby
isolating Molotov with still another similar cynical political
tactic. This further emphasis on a "normalization" of relations
was translated into Soviet concessions with respect to Austria,
and an effort to reconcile Belgrade to Moscow. At the Warsaw
Treaty Conference, Bulganin, who spoke for the Soviet government,
stated that "the unalterable principle of Soviet foreign policy
is Lenin's principle of coexistence of different social systems."
Whereas earlier pronouncements had emphasized the aggressive
nature of the Western powers, and specifically the threat to
peace inherent in the Paris Agreements, Bulganin balanced his
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hostility toward the Paris Agreements and "aggressive military
blocs" with conciliatory gestures stressing the Soviet commit-
ment to peace. His references to the future East European mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact also contrasted with earlier categorical
assertions. Bulganin stressed that the "consultations held by
the participants" revealed a full unanimity of views concerning
the need for a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. He
added
:
"The relations between our countries are an embodiment
of the noble principles of socialist internationalism,
of the noble idea of fraternal friendship between free
and equal Nations." [17]
C. EARLY STRUCTURE
The language of the Warsaw Treaty itself, while similar to
its NATO counterpart, reflected the international priorities of
the Bulganin-Khrushchev leadership. The treaty consisted of
eleven articles (see Appendix A) defining the member states
relationships to one another, (particularly in the event of
aggression) to the United Nations and to non-member states.
Basing the treaty on the "principle of respect for the independ-
ence and sovereignty of others and noninterference in internal
affairs," (article 8) the members agreed: (1) to settle all
disputes peacefully (article 1) ; (2) to consult on all inter-
national issues affecting their common interest; (3) to consult
immediately in the event that one of the signators were threat-
ened with armed attack (article 3) ; (4) to establish a joint
command (article 5) and a political consultative committee
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(article 6) ; and (5) to promote the economic and cultural inter-
course within the group (article 8) . With regard to the United
Nations, the treaty specified that it was in accordance with
the UN charter (article 1) and that measures of joint defense
would be taken under article 51 of the UN charter (article 4) •
As for non-member states, all "European" states were invited
to join the treaty if they agreed with its aims "irrespective
of their social and political systems" (article 9) . In hailing
the Warsaw Treaty as a new benchmark in international relations,
the Soviets pointed to this clause and contrasted NATO's rejec-
tion of the USSR's request for membership in March 1954. Never-
theless, membership was limited to the Soviet Union and the
East European Communist states, suggesting that Moscow considers
ideological compatibility a prerequisite for maintaining a work-
able arrangement. The treaty partners agreed to take part in
international activities designed to safeguard the peace (article
2), but conversely agreed not to join any coalition or alliance,
or make an agreement in conflict with the WTO (article 7) . The
treaty was to have an initial duration of twenty years, con-
tingent on the realization of a general European treaty of
5Both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact refer
specifically to article 51 rather than to the articles of the
UN charter concerned with regional arrangements. Article 51
is not part of the chapter devoted to regional arrangements,
nor is it considered to refer to regional arrangements. The
situation here was that neither the Soviet nor Allied policy-
makers wanted their organizations to be subject to the authority
of the UN Security Council as are regional organizations accord-
ing to article 53 of the UN charter. [18]
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collective security, with automatic prolongation unless one
years notice of withdrawal was given. [19]
Unlike NATO, the political and military organization of the
Warsaw Pact has never been made public in any detail. Its con-
stituent commissions and advisory bodies are referred to in the
Soviet press infrequently and without insightful specificity.
Little is known of the institutional structure set up by the
Warsaw Treaty. The treaty itself referred only to a Political
Consultative Committee with the power to appoint auxiliary
bodies. Further organizational details were worked out in a
closed session during the January 1956 Political Consultative
Committee (PCC) meeting. At that time two auxiliary institutions
were created: (1) a standing commission to work out recommenda-
tions on questions of foreign policy; and (2) a joint secretariat
which was to be staffed by representatives of all treaty members.
The PCC also decided during this first session that it should
meet not less than twice a year thereafter with the chairmanship
of future meetings rotating among the members. From 1956 until
recently, organizational decisions among treaty members were not
made public, nor has there been any further mention of the activ-
ities of either the Standing Policy Commission or the Joint
Secretariat. (Further structural changes were made in the
aftermath of the 1968 Czech invasion. These issues will be
discussed in chapters 3 and 4.)
In the military arena, the eight countries party to the
Warsaw Treaty (Albania, one of the original members, opted out
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of the alliance in September, 1968) issued a "Resolution on the
Formation of a Unified Command of Armed Forces." Under the Pact,
a joint command of Soviet and East European armed forces was set
up, with Soviet Marshal I. S. Konev as its first Commander-in-
Chief. He was to be assisted by the ministers of defense of the
other member states as deputy commanders-in-chief, who were to
have charge of the armed forces contributed by their home states.
A staff of the joint armed forces, including permanent members
from the East European general staffs, was to be located in
Moscow,
The Pact's first Chief of Staff, General A. I. Anitov, was
also one of the two First Deputy Chiefs of the Soviet General
Staff, and his WTO staff appeared to be an integral part of the
Soviet Ministry of Defense. No further details of the Pact's
early military organization are available. [20] Disposition of
the joint forces on the territories of the member states was to
be covered by separate agreements among the states as the
"requirements of their mutual defense might indicate." This
particular provision solved the immediate problem of justifying
a continued occupation by Soviet forces of East European territory.
This difficulty was overcome by including in the announcement of
the establishment of the Warsaw Pact High Command the statement
that the deployment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were
being arranged in accordance with the mutual defense requirements
of the states concerned.
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On the heels of the founding of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet
diplomacy took a further step forward stabilizing the European
situation. In response to the changed Soviet attitude on the
Austrian Treaty, President Eisenhower set aside the conditions
he had established as prerequisites for a general European
summit. In July, 1955, the Geneva Summit Conference was con-
vened to discuss the problems of Europe, including German re-
unification, European security, disarmament, and means to
improve East-West contacts. This conference, which grew in part
out of the cordial atmosphere created by the Austrian settlement,
afforded Khrushchev his first opportunity to deal face-to-face
with the Western heads of government, though nominally he did
not yet hold office. (Khrushchev did not succeed Bulganin as
Premier until November, 1958.) Unfortunately, neither the
"friendly exchange" at the Summit in July, nor the Ministerial
Conference that followed in the fall (the Geneva Meeting of
Foreign Ministers - October 27-November 16, 1955) yielded tang-
ible progress on the problems of German reunification, European
security, and disarmament. However, the atmosphere of detente
which prevailed at the Geneva Conference, superficial though it
may have appeared to some critics, was to persuade many people
that the Cold War had passed its peak. Under the influence of
the Geneva thaw and other developments of the mid-fifties —
the opening of East-West disarmament negotiations, the establish-
ment of Soviet-West German diplomatic relations, and the de-
nounciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, among
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others — sentiments grew in Western Europe that not only had the
rigors of the Cold War subsided, but so had the Soviet military
threat to Europe. [21]
From a political point of view, the Warsaw Pact — despite
its minimal structure — had been an important prop for the
Soviet strategy at Geneva. In a draft European Collective
Security Treaty envisaged by the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic
Treaty, the Paris Agreements, and the Warsaw Treaty would si-
multaneously cease to operate, to be replaced by an all-European
collective security system. This was the Soviet Union's maxi-
mum goal, but one which the Soviets obviously did not expect to
achieve at that time. Bulganin had hedged the suggestion by
making the move contingent upon an agreement on armament reduc-
tion and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of
European countries. Obviously, the United States Congress could
be counted on to refuse such an agreement. As noted, no concrete
steps were taken at the Summit, and Bulganin 's proposal was
reserved for future consideration at the October Foreign Ministers
Conference. At the close of the Geneva Summit Conference the
Soviets published a Polish article which insisted that the
results of the Summit indisputably proved the significance of
the Warsaw Treaty. After this, further references to the Warsaw
Treaty disappeared from the Soviet press until the first Political
Consultative Committee meeting in January 1956. These facts,
along with the lack of any reference to GDR membership in the
Warsaw Treaty Organization, with the signing of the Soviet-East
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German Bilateral Treaty in September, 19 55, support the presump-
tion that, at least initially, the Warsaw Pact had a largely
propagandistic significance relative to Soviet East-West
maneuvering. [22]
In addition to the motivations rooted in Cold War intrigue,
there were other very good political and military reasons for
establishing some kind of organization in Eastern Europe through
which the new Soviet leadership could adapt their own style to
the system of control inherited from Stalin. The Soviet leaders
needed a political organization through which they could continue
to transmit directives to their East European allies and to
organize East European support for Soviet policy objectives.
Further, the Soviet government desired an agency that could pro-
vide a more efficient framework for controlling and administer-
ing the East European armies, navies, and air forces. Lastly,
this organization had to at least give the appearance of being
a forum in which East European views could be taken into account
and thus help reduce the visible signs of Soviet domination.
The new Warsaw Pact also fulfilled important military
requirements for the Soviets. The Khrushchev-Bulganin leader-
ship recognized that Stalin's military policy towards Eastern
Europe had been both primitive and wasteful. Primitive because
Soviet army regulations had been imposed on the national armies
down to the most trivial detail, because Soviet officers had
been dispatched to key appointments and because the special
privileges and rights reserved for Soviet officers were
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regarded as humiliating by their East European hosts. Stalin's
policies were wasteful because he was reluctant to equip East
European armies with anything but obsolete weapons, because no
attempts were made to coordinate training under the existing bi-
lateral defense treaties, because Stalin had relegated East
European forces to the task of internal security, and lastly
because Stalin clearly distrusted the national officer corps,
which he frequently purged with characteristic ruthlessness
.
After Stalin's death, Soviet defense policy and requirements
began to be reoriented in terms of nuclear weapons and postwar
delivery and transport systems. As for the European "theater
of operations," the new military doctrine required East European
forces to play a part in the defense of the Soviet Union's
western frontier. The Soviet leaders recognized that their
European vassals could hardly be left out of a needed modernizing
process, and should be re-equipped to assume a vital role in
manning a "buffer zone" between their borders and the West.
Forming the Warsaw Pact was, therefore, a logical step to
effect the training, re-equipping and coordination of the East
European forces under a new Soviet direction.
Eighteen months after the Pact was formed, in the fall of
1956, the emergent Geneva optimism was dealt a hard blow with
virtually simultaneous crises in Eastern Europe and in the
Middle East, both of which produced tensions at odds with the
notion of a durable East-West detente. In the second case,
East-West tensions rose sharply when the Soviet Union threatened
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to intervene militarily, hinting that Soviet rockets might be
used against France and Britain as a result of their attack on
Egypt in the Suez Crisis, even though the Soviet missile inven-
tory was far too limited to lend much substance to Khrushchev's
threats. [23] In the first case, a national anti-Soviet uprising
swept Hungary, which during the Imre Nagy regime virtually
destroyed the Communist system. Against the background of the
Eisenhower-Dulles policy of "liberation," which in words called
for the emancipation of Soviet dominated satellites, Nagy an-
nounced Hungary's unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and
enunciated a "neutralist" foreign policy. The Soviet response
was both immediate and overwhelming. Without the benefit of
consultation , a Soviet army from the Carpathian Military District
invaded the country, (following the route used by the Russian
Imperial Army, which suppressed the Hungarian uprising of 184 9)
,
overthrew the Nagy regime, and replaced it with a pro-Soviet
leadership under Janos Kadar. Hungarian military and civilian
resistance was crushed within a few days, and the deposed leaders
were abducted, tried and executed on Soviet orders. The
Hungarian Army was virtually disbanded, and it was not until the
mid-1960 's that Hungarian divisions once again joined the ranks
of the Warsaw Pact forces. The swift suppression of the Hungar-
ian revolt underscored Soviet readiness to unilaterally use
force to keep Eastern Europe within the orthodox Communist fold.
However, the brutual suppression of the Hungarian uprising
compelled the Soviet leaders to make concessions elsewhere in
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Eastern Europe. Khrushchev's "tactics of recovery" from the
Hungarian crisis included new status-of-forces agreements which
in most cases favored the host countries.
Any attempt to understand behavior as an index of changing
realities and attitudes must first be examined under the original
set of conditions. Therefore, it was natural and necessary to
start at or precede the beginning. In our case, the Soviet
Union had already signed bilateral treaties of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance with all the East European
countries except East Germany and Albania. Why then, did the
Soviets create a multilateral alliance such as the Warsaw Pact?
In this second chapter, I have attempted to set down the relevant
factors and events which prompted the Soviets to take such a
move. Clearly, on the surface, the explanation is straight-
forward and correct, the Warsaw Treaty was rooted in deep Soviet
and East European fears of a rearmed and revanchist Germany.
Specifically it grew out of Moscow's campaign to prevent West
German membership in the West European Union, and as a result,
NATO. Additionally, the Soviets had hoped to edge United States
armed forces off the continent, and American influence generally
out of the European sphere by creating an all-European security
system to outflank the Western defense. Although fear of a
reviving German militarism provided the impetus for the Warsaw
Pact, we know that Soviet internal developments strongly colored
the Soviet perception of its utility. Evolving attitudes in
Moscow and changing political processes in the European arena
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were the catalyst for inconsistent Soviet perceptions of its
purpose. For Khrushchev, the importance of the Warsaw Pact
focused outside itself; a reflection of his ambition for equal
status with the West. For his purpose, the Pact was not intended
to fight, but to gain position in the ideological struggle with
the West. For others in the Kremlin, the Pact was a vehicle for
socialist consolidation, military preparedness and defense. [24]
Thus it is not strange that many and conflicting Soviet policies
were evident in the early days of the Warsaw Treaty Organization
and in Moscow's early analysis of its importance. Detente,
defense of the Socialist Camp, disarmament, and threat of
imperialist aggression were some of the conflicting themes which
surfaced during the pitched, largely submerged struggle for
political power which followed Stalin's death, and which dominated
as aspects of political life in Europe. The Warsaw Pact,
born of Cold War intrigue, and modeled on NATO, acquired sub-
stance largely in relation to Soviet policy toward Eastern
Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth.
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III. MILITARY ASPECTS OF SOVIET
POLICY IN THE WARSAW PACT
A. STALIN: 1947-1956
The founding in 1955 of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as
the formal multilateral security alliance of the states within
the Soviet bloc was not principally a consequence of a Soviet
desire to rationalize the East European armed forces. Ex-
ternally, it was a political response to the incorporation of
a remilitarized West Germany into the Western security system.
Internally, the founding of the Pact represented a Soviet
effort to establish a multilateral political organization,
no matter how devoid of substance, that in concert with the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) , could pro-
vide an institutional substitute for the personalized l^-
Stalinist system of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
Following Stalin's death, and with a partial easing of
East-West tensions, the Soviet leadership sought to relax
the most extreme forms of forced subservience to Soviet con-
trol in Eastern Europe — essentials of the Stalinist inter-
state system that became Soviet liabilities with the removal
of the system's personal linchpin. Economic considerations
were brought to the fore in the Soviet effort to redress
what was now considered Stalin's "misallocation" of military-
related resources in Eastern Europe. Stalin's forced
mobilization of East European armed forces had so overstretched
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the East European economies that the military burden had
serious destabilizing political ramifications. While defense
policy was not the sole factor causing East European dissent
in the mid-1950' s, it does represent one of several "miscalcula-
tions" on Stalin's part. As noted in the previous chapter,
Stalin's military policy towards Eastern Europe had been
both primitive and wasteful.
As Soviet military thought was freed of Stalin's tradi-
tional "permanent operating factors of war" , Soviet defense
policy and requirements were being redefined in the light
of nuclear weapons and postwar improvements in means of
delivery, transport, and speed of movement for the ground
forces. Stalin had resisted doctrinal implications of the
technical possibilities for greater mechanization and concen-
tration of ground forces; these were now accepted and Soviet
policy toward the East European armed forces was affected in
turn. As far as the European theater of operations was
concerned, the new Soviet military doctrine required that
Soviet and East European forces play a part in the defense
of the Soviet Union's "open" western frontier, by manning the
"buffer zone" between the Soviet border and the West, by
Stalin's five "permanently operating factors" were:
(1) the stability of the rear; (2) the morale of the army;
(3) the quantity and quality of the divisions; (4) the
equipment of the armed forces; and (5) the organizational




maintaining internal security and orthodox Communist parties
in power, and, in the event of war, by advancing rapidly west-
ward to destroy NATO forces and occupy NATO territory. The
post-Stalin Soviet leaders realized that their East European
allies could hardly be left out of this modernizing process,
and in order that they should assume a role of real value to
the Soviet army, their forces had to be reorganized, re-
equipped, cut down to realistic strengths and provided with
necessary mobility. Above all, their activity, training,
and assignments had to be effectively coordinated under Soviet
direction. The formation of some type of Soviet-East European
command structure became a logical step for the new leader-
ship to take in order to solve the problems posed by Stalin's
passing.
Turning briefly now to the evolution of Soviet military
doctrine during Stalin's postwar years, two basic considera-
tions were paramount on the Soviet military policy agenda:
(1) the deepening U.S. involvement in Europe and the American
lead in nuclear technology, by which the United States could
exploit potential unrest in Eastern Europe or could react
unpredictably in a dangerous fashion to Soviet political
moves; and (2) the long-range task of steering the Soviet
Union through an indefinite period of vulnerability while
efforts were made to pare down the West's enormous military
advantage. [1] Therefore, Soviet military policy under Stalin
was partly the product of necessity and partly the result of
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Soviet preoccupation with Europe as the decisive arena in
which the inevitable contest between East and West would be
played out.
The most pressing problem on Stalin's military agenda
was that of imposing some adequate restraint on United States
power, particularly when the U.S. nuclear lead was accompanied
by a great advantage in strategic delivery forces. In the
Soviet view, the United States was inherently hostile, and
any restraint on its part would not result from American good
will, but from pressure that Soviet forces could exert against
7
the United States.
However, the kind of continental military power at Stalin's
disposal was ill-suited to bring direct pressure to bear
against the United States; waging a war to some "successful"
conclusion against a nuclear-armed transoceanic adversary
was beyond Soviet capability. Therefore, if the United
States was to be deterred from pressing its nuclear advantage,
then Soviet forces at hand would have to suffice, and the
place where this could be best effected was obvioulsy Western
7Regardless of the Soviet view, U.S. restraint was every
bit as much self-imposed as it was the product of Soviet
doing. The idea of postponing a showdown with the Soviet
Union, even during the period of U.S. atomic monopoly, when
it was no secret that the Soviets were on their way to
acquiring their own atomic bomb, was the underlying premise
of "informed" American policy. This idea was based far more
deeply on the hope that "time" might heal the differences
between the U.S. and the USSR, than upon any notion that
additional time would facilitate preparations for delivering
a final "crushing" nuclear ultimatum to the Soviet Union. [2]
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Europe. By keeping substantial elements of its combined-
arms forces deployed in the European theater, poised to
rapidly advance westward, the Soviet Union could hope to make
Western Europe a hostage for American good behavior. At the
same time, these forces could prevent defections from within
the socialist camp as well as guard against a resurgent
Germany. These considerations, in conjunction with a con-
tinental military tradition, helped to explain why the USSR
continued to place great emphasis on preserving strong con-
ventional theater forces even after the militant Zhdanovist
phase of Soviet European policy. Lacking as yet the means
to adopt a strategy of nuclear deterrence, such as the United
States had, Stalin really had no other alternative but to
rely on Russia's traditional theater forces as the primary
instrument of Soviet policy.
In contrast with the American military posture of the
late 1940 's and early 1950 's, which enabled the United States
to begin the practice of nuclear deterrence, the Soviet mili-
tary posture lent itself to deterrence only if the threat of
Soviet invasion of Western Europe seemed credible. Thus,
Stalin could hardly have deflated military programs and prep-
arations to the degree the West had done immediately after
the war, and though these programs doubtlessly enhanced Soviet
capabilities in the European theater, they undoubtedly stirred
great apprehension in the West. Whether Stalin intended
simply to discourage the West from interfering in the affairs
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of the Soviet bloc he was then in the process of consolidating,
or whether he felt that an aggressive policy backed by the
authority of Soviet arms might bring substantial political
gains in Western Europe is rather uncertain. However, what
actually happened largely ran counter to Stalin's interests.
Western uncertainty about Soviet intentions — stemming in
part from Soviet readiness to use massive conventional forces
against Western Europe, led to the gradual build-up of U.S.
strategic power, to the affirmation of greater political
solidarity among the countries of Western Europe, and gave
the real impetus to the planning for a common defense of
Europe, which brought NATO into being.
Another important effect of Stalin's persistent endeavor
to improve Soviet capabilities for traditional theater war-
fare in Europe was to prolong the dominance of a continental
military tradition in Soviet military development and
strategy. The priority placed in Stalin's lifetime upon the
role of the combined-arms forces in the European theater was
to persist well into Khrushchev's reign. Thereafter, post-
Stalin Soviet military thinkers were left to grapple with
the problem of setting new priorities associated with a
strategy for nuclear warfare. The weight of old traditional
thinking was certainly to influence early Soviet perceptions
of the role of Warsaw Pact forces.
Stalin's emphasis on traditional Russian combined-arms
strategy does not, however, suggest that he was indifferent
to the military technical revolution which ushered in the
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nuclear age, or that he was resigned to accept a purely con-
tinental military posture. Stalin had come early to recognize
the need for breaking the U.S. atomic monopoly, and even before
the success of the American nuclear weapons program was assured,
he had sanctioned the start of a similar Soviet program. [3]
Stalin was clearly determined that the Soviet Union should not
be left behind in the technological revolution which the nuclear
achievement heralded. As the record testifies, Stalin bent
great efforts to make the Soviet Union a nuclear power. In
o
August, 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first (detected)
nuclear device, and then slightly less than four years later,
its first thermonuclear device. Additionally, both the tech-
nological record and our other occasional more indirect
evidence into Stalin's decisions testify to the fact that he
also gave serious thought to the need for future long-range
delivery systems. [4] There is thus no doubt that the credit
for initiating programs of research and development that ul-
timately made the Soviet Union a nuclear superpower belongs
to the man most criticized for impeding "creative development"
of Soviet military thought.
Without discounting the negative influence that Stalin's
attitudes may have had on Soviet military thinking and
p
The first known Soviet atomic test on August 24, 194 9
could have been preceded by earlier testing before the U.S.
test detection system went into operation. Molotov, in
November 1947, claimed that the Soviet Union already possessed
the secret of the atomic weaoon.
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preparations at the dawn of the nuclear age, it would seem
only fair to judge his outlook in light of the circumstances
in which the Soviet Union found itself at the time. The USSR
had just begun to acquire a small nuclear capability, distinctly
inferior to its American counterpart. From the Russian view-
point, the immediate aim of Soviet policy was therefore to
avoid being attacked or intimidated by its stronger opponent.
In these circumstances, it made sense to publicly deprecate
the military and political significance of nuclear weapons
and to stress the role of the Soviet Union's large conventional
forces, while simultaneously resolving secretly to close the
nuclear gap. Therefore it was left to Stalin's successors to
indulge in the practice of "nuclear blackmail" or to raise
the spectre of "mass destruction" when the Soviet Union had
9
attained a somewhat more substantial nuclear capability.
Only in the later years of the Stalinist period was the
revival of East European armed forces an important corollary
to the strengthening of the Soviet military posture against
Western Europe. This process began in 1948, following the
disasterous effects of the "Zhdanovschina" during which the
fortunes of the badly disorganized national armies of the
9Interestingly enough, the continental orientation of
the Soviet military remained in evidence when nuclear weapons
were initially introduced into the operational forces . The
bulk of the initial Soviet effort to fashion a nuclear delivery




East European states were at their lowest ebb. The national
armed forces in Eastern Europe were largely "empty shells",
small, poorly supported with obsolete equipment, and in most
countries neutralized by occupying Soviet forces. In the
initial postwar years, it had been in the interest of both
the national Communist Parties and the USSR that the East
European armed forces should remain in an emasculated condition
In Czechoslovakia, where a relatively strong army emerged
from World War II, the Communist Party encouraged its dis-
mantling as an institution which could potentially threaten
a future Communist seizure of power. [5]
After placing the East European military command struc-
tures in "neutral", the East European Communists concentrated
their efforts on placing Party activists in key positions
within the armed forces, and more importantly, sought to gain
control of, and then to build up the internal security ap-
paratus of each state. These "militarized" security forces,
distinct from the "regular" armed forces, played a pivotal
role in repressing "anti-democratic" political forces which
opposed Communist Party rule. The Polish Communist party used
these militarized security forces through the late 1940 's to
suppress internal opposition instead of using the regular
army. However, it was during the National Front Coalition
period of the People's Democracies (1945-1948) that the Com-
munists began to consolidate control of the political
departments of the East European armed forces. By 1948,
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local Communists began to replace non-Communist ministers of
defense. Emil Bodnaras became Minister of Defense in Romania.
Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky was made Minister of Defense in
Poland in late 1949, and Alexij Cepicka became Defense Minister
of Czechoslovakia in April, 1950. With Communists sitting atop
the East European military hierarchies, the process of elimina-
ting potentially disloyal, restless or incompetent elements
within armed forces was accelerated. There was intensive
political indoctrination, and all high ranking officers were
required to attend courses at political-military institutes,
many located in the Soviet Union.
By 1949, with Communist regimes firmly in power throughout
Eastern Europe, (the Czech-Communist coup was in February,
1948) Stalin evidently decided the time had come to rehabili-
tate and expand the East European armed forces. One observer
dates the first steps in the rehabilitation of the East Euro-
pean armies to March, 194 9, shortly before the signing of the
North Atlantic Treaty, when the Soviet Union established a
secret bureau to oversee satellite armies, and when they made
the prominent Marshal Rokossovsky, a Russian officer. Minister
of Defense in Poland. [6] These moves seem to reflect the
extent of the Soviet's desire to maintain control of the
In some cases the officers of the East European armies
were, in fact, Russians. All technical, military and non-
military matters were coordinated with Soviet usages such as
style of uniforms, marching and drill.
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military rehabilitation process in Eastern Europe, with a
view to integrating the satellite armies more closely into
the Soviet system of control over East Europe. As noted in
the second chapter, and illustrated in Appendix B, the Soviet
Union completed a series of bilateral defense treaties with
East European countries beginning in 1948, which doubtless
provided a further basis for the military rehabilitation pro-
gram undertaken in the years 1949-1953.
Also beginning in 1948, Eastern Europe underwent Stalin-
ization. Domestically, the political and economic systems
were forced into the Stalinist Soviet mold; internationally,
the East European countries were subordinated under Soviet
direction to such an extent that they nearly ceased to conduct
independent foreign policies. The national military estab-
lishments were similarly affected. As noted, military com-
mand positions were filled with Communist and pro-Communist
officers, usually of "low" social origin and with little or
no prior military experience. The internal organization,
training patterns, doctrine, tactics, and, as noted, such
trivial matters as uniforms, were modified to conform to the
Soviet model. As the heterogeneous structure of the various
national forces were modified to conform to Soviet organiza-
tional patterns, widespread personnel purges were carried out
on grounds of both political reliability and professional
efficiency, and as noted, large missions of Soviet officers
took over staff as well as command responsibility for
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retraining the East European armed forces. At the same time,
as Soviet forces in Europe were being equipped with modern
weapons, satellite military establishments began to receive
sizable quantities of Soviet arms, though this material was
much less up-to-date than the newest equipments being intro-
duced into the Soviet units. (The main improvements for the
groups of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe lay in
increasing their battlefield mobility and firepower by motor-
izing and strengthening their armored elements.) However, the
massive introduction of Soviet arms into the East European
armies did lay the basis for standardization of equipment and
procedures that was carried further during later phases of
joint Soviet-East European military arrangements under the
Warsaw Pact.
Within the national military structures, the local Com-
munist parties established triple channels of political control;
the command channel secured through the replacement of prewar
officers by party loyalists was complemented by extending the
networks of the Central Committee-directed political adminis-
tration, and the security services, each with an endogenous
chain of command, to the regimental level and below. [7]
However, the network of bilateral defense treaties and the
dependency of the East European Communist parties on the Soviets
not withstanding, the consolidation of national party control
over the respective East European armed forces was for Stalin
an inadequate guarantee that they would be totally responsive
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to Soviet directives. Direct Soviet channels of control were
created by subordinating the Soviet-trained East European com-
manders to Soviet officers of the respective national origin
who had served in the Red Army as Soviet citizens. This was
the case in Poland when Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky became
Minister-of-Defense and Commander-in-Chief in 1949. Also the
positions of Chief of the General Staff, Commander of Ground
Forces, the heads of all service branches, and the commanders
of all the Polish military districts were likewise former
Soviet officers who now resumed their original Polish citizen-
ship. This practice was widespread in the Hungarian Army,
and was followed to a lesser extent in other East European
armed forces. [8] More importantly, thousands of Soviet
"advisors" were then placed within the East European armies,
constituting a fourth and primary chain-of-command. By means
of this "advisor system" the Soviet high command was able to
dispose of the East European armed forces as branches of the
Soviet armed forces. In the Stalinist period, then, an infor-
mal, but effective unified Soviet command-and-control system
over an "integrated" East European force was established, set-
ting a standard to which latter-day Soviet leaders would
aspire.
After 194 9, conscription was introduced into all the East
European armed forces, with the exception of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR) , where the National People's Army,
formally established in 19 56, introduced conscription only in
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1962, after construction of the Berlin Wall had halted massive
emigration from East Germany. The results of this initial
rebuilding of the armed forces of the satellite countries
during the Stalinist period were numerically impressive. By
1953, these forces had attained through conscription a strength
of about 1.5 million men organized in from sixty-five to eighty
divisions, although perhaps less than half were well enough
trained and equipped to be of some combat significance. [9]
On the whole, the rehabilitation and build-up of the
satellite forces in Stalin's last years was a process far from
completion at the time of his death. Though, as early as 1950,
the Soviet "pattern" had been imposed on the East European
armed forces, the reliability and the military efficiency of
these forces posed serious questions for the Soviet Union. "^
Military integration of the Eastern Bloc forces with the Soviet
forces had made little progress under the bilateral arrange-
ments that prevailed, except in the area of air defense. Cer-
tainly, Stalin's integration produced no joint framework for
cooperative military activity comparable to that perfected in
later years under the Warsaw Pact. However, Stalin did set in
motion important changes and programs which during the next
decade led to the development of a substantial East European
military potential. In sum, even prior to creating the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, the Soviets had begun to remold the armed
forces of Eastern Europe into a separate, subordinate, but
still questionable arm of the USSR armed forces. [10]
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B. KHRUSHCHEV: 1956 -1968
The founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 as a formal, multi-
lateral security alliance of the states within the Soviet orbit
had little to do with the process of rationalizing the Soviet
and East European military forces. There is little evidence
to suggest that the Warsaw Treaty was needed, or even seriously
expected to serve as a means to accommodate this integration.
As suggested, the Communists had consolidated their control ^
of the East European armed forces during the National Front
Coalition period, purging dissident elements and initiating
an intensive political indoctrination. Prior to establishing
the joint forces under the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviets had
already restructured the satellite armed forces to be respon-
sive to their direction. Little substantive reorganization
of East European armed forces remained to be done when the Pact
came into being, and whether any genuine reorganization of
East European forces resulted from the creation of the joint
command under Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty is a matter of
some speculation. [11] Very little information on the early
reorganization and structure of Warsaw Pact forces is available
In the West, it is generally accepted that apart from a fur-
ther standardization and upgrading of weaponry, the WTO simply
continued earlier arrangements for Soviet consolidation of
East European forces. Outsiders tended to consider the War-
saw Pact as being of negligible military value, and viewed
the treaty as a Soviet means to justify the maintenance of
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their troops on East European territory. In reality, the Pact
may have hastened the integration of East European forces begun
under Stalin, serving largely as an important extension of the
early-warning and air defense systems and as an ideological
buffer between East and West. The Soviets themselves em-
phasized only the "defensive" nature of the Pact and phrased
their references concerning its military expectations in the
most vague and general terms. The possibility that Moscow
weighed the value of the Warsaw Pact at least partially in
terms of tightening Soviet military control within Eastern
Europe should not be discounted. The absence of any evidence
that either political or military organization of the Warsaw
Pact was independent of any existing Soviet institutions
suggests that the Soviet government wanted to establish a
more viable hold on the area. [12]
All Warsaw Treaty members except East Germany contributed
to the Pact's early military organization. The East German
forces were not incorporated into the Pact's military struc-
ture until January, 1956, after the first PCC meeting took
place. The PCC accepted East Germany's participation in the
Joint Command and gave the C;dr equal military status with the
other East European members. There is really little doubt of
a Soviet initiative in the move to change East Germany's status.
Although na distinctions were made with respect to GDR member-
ship in the Warsaw Treaty text, East German participation in




This omission seems to support the assumption that, at least
initially, the Warsaw Treaty had a largely propogandistic
significance related to Soviet East-West maneuvering. [13]
Moreover, the GDR contingents were accepted into the unified
command only after a bilateral treaty was signed with the
Soviet Union, which purported to give East Germany the same
kind of status the Western Allies had granted Bonn in May, 1952.
The Warsaw Treaty did provide for a joint military com-
mand, which was formally established m Moscow m early 1956.
The first Commander-in-Chief of the Pact's forces was a Soviet
officer, Marshal I. S. Konev, and each of the Ministers of
Defense of the member countries ranked as Deputy Commanders-
in-Chief. The first Chief of Staff, General A. J. Antonov,
was one of the first deputy chiefs of the Soviet General Staff,
and his staff, which was also located in Moscow, appeared to
be an integral part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The
staff of the joint armed forces also included permanent mem-
bers from the East European general staffs. The disposition
of the joint armed forces on the territories of member states
was to be covered by separate agreements among the states as
their "mutual defense requirements might indicate." Few fur-
ther details of the Pact's early military organization are
available. Yet, in 1956, East European and Soviet press
reports began to refer to the presence of senior Soviet mili-
tary officers in the capitals of non-Soviet members of the
Pact, later identified as official military representatives of
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the Warsaw Pact High Command. No comparable East European
missions were set up in Moscow, and East European officers
who were attached to the joint staff had little say in Pact
military planning. In military terms, the WTO remained a
paper organization until the 1960 's. Initially, its single
concrete military purpose was to provide an alternative legit-
imization for deployment of Soviet forces in Hungary and
Rumania after the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. [14]
Even this rationale was short lived, as unrest in Eastern
Europe in 1956 led to Soviet military pressure in Poland and
the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian counter-revolution.
One consequence of the harsh Soviet treatment of East European
dissent was a heightened sensitivity to the "forms" of national
sovereignty among East European leaders in military matters
as well as in other national political realms. The "rehabili-
tation" of East European armed forces begun in Stalin's last
years was now declared complete. In Poland, Marshal Rokos-
sovsky and his fellow Soviet officers were recalled to the
Soviet Union. National military uniforms were rehabilitated. -^
Most importantly, the Soviet government's declaration of
October 1956, on more equitable relations between the USSR
and the East European countries (issued just prior to Hungary's
renunciation of the WTO)
,
professed a Soviet willingness to
review the whole issue of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern
Europe. Not withstanding the brutal Soviet suppression of
the Hungarian revolt, in December, 1956, the Soviets concluded
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a status-of-forces agreement with Poland specifying the terms
of the stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory and
pledging their "non-interference" in Polish affairs. Similar
status-of-forces agreements were concluded with Hungary,
Rumania and East Germany by early 1957 as part of Khrushchev's
"tactics of recovering" from the East European crisis of
1956. [15] These treaties regulated the judicial rights and
limitations of Soviet troops stationed abroad, and, in most
cases, favored the host countries. However, the preamble to
the treaties stressed the requirements of the Warsaw Pact as
the basis for the deployment of Soviet forces. As a final
gesture to East European national sentiments, perhaps as a
specific result of warming Rumanian-Chinese relations, Moscow
acceded to a Rumanian request and withdrew all Soviet troops
from Rumanian territory by early 1958.
In the years immediately following the Hungarian uprising
and the Polish crisis, there is little evidence to suggest
that the military contributions of the East European armed ^
forces carried any more weight in Soviet planning than had
been the case in Stalin's day. Apart from the continued
Following the Hungarian uprising, the Hungarian army
was virtually disbanded, and its rebuilding began only very
slowly; it was not until the mid-1960 's that Hungarian
divisions were once again able to join the ranks of the Warsaw
Pact. Even today, the Hungarian army numbers little more than
half the eleven-divisions strong force which failed to support
the Soviet cause in October, 1956. At the time, the Soviets
increased their permanent garrison in Hungary from two to five
divisions; four divisions are still maintained there today.
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improvement of joint air defense arrangements in Eastern
Europe, the Soviets made no real effort to weld the Warsaw
Pact into an integrated military alliance. Little attention
was given to the problems of conducting modern theater war-
12fare on a coalition basis, few joint exercises were held,
and the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact remained mostly a
paper organization with little real work on their hands.
There was, however, some progress made in the early years
of the Warsaw Pact towards integrating and strengthening the
East European armed forces, representing essentially the con-
tinuation of the trends begun in the latter part of the
Stalinist period. A further standardization of weapons was
accompanied by limited local arms production under Soviet
license. Cuts of 2.5 million men were reported to have been
made in the strength of forces between 1955 and 1959, and
as noted, after 1956, many Soviet officers serving in the
East European armed forces returned to the Soviet Union or
left the arroy. East European armed forces continued to adopt
Soviet organizational forms and field doctrine, and a broader
12According to Marshal I. I. lakubovskii ' s volume on the
WTO, two joint exercises had taken place before 1961. In
August, 1957, Soviet and East German troops conducted a joint
exercise, and in July/August, 1958, Soviet air forces and
Bulgarian forces conducted a joint exercise on Bulgarian
territory. [16]
13Between 1955 and 1959 Soviet forces were reduced by
2,140,000 men and East European Pact forces were cut back by




definition of military tasks fell to several of the national
armies. However, while the armed forces of the various Pact
countries served the obvious purpose of providing support for
the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and meeting certain
traditional needs for national prestige, they could hardly
be counted upon to bear much of the burden of any military
undertakings in which the Warsaw Pact might become involved.
This responsibility clearly rested upon the Soviet Union's
own military forces. [17]
As the evidence suggests, in the period between the
Hungarian revolution and 1960, the East European armed forces
did gain something from the streamlining and re-equiping of
their armies, from the integration of their air defenses with
that of the Soviet Union, and from a renewed sense of national
military and professional pride stemming from a more respon-
sive Soviet posture in Eastern Europe. By February, 1960,
when the Political Consultative Committee met for the fourth
time, the military forces of at least some of the Pact coun-
tries had completed their post-Stalin reorganizations and
were ready to enter the next phase of Soviet bloc military
collaboration. Yet the absence of any evidence to show that
either the political or the military organizations of the War-
saw Pact were independent of existing Soviet institutions
suggests that the Soviet Union wanted to establish the Pact ^
as an agency which could transmit Soviet directives, coordinate
their implementation, and thus project an "unanimous" East
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European expression of support for them. Particularly in the
military field, it desired an agency that could provide the
framework for controlling and administering the East European
forces as additional elements set up within the Soviet Ministry
of Defense. [18]
The early years of the 1960 's were turbulent in Europe,
associated with Khrushchev's premature bid to achieve a
position of global strength vis-a-vis the United States by
a series of "shortcuts" in foreign and military policy. This
was the period when Khrushchev introduced his "nuclear mis-
sile" strategy, the short but significant "wrinkle" in Soviet
strategic thought mentioned in the introductory chapter.
Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact entered a new phase under
Khrushchev around this time, coincident with sharply increased
tensions in Europe over Berlin and with the serious deteriora-
tion of Sino-Soviet relations on the other side of the world
(characterized by the sudden withdrawal of Soviet military aid
to Peking in July 1960) . This period witnessed the break-up
of the Paris Summit, the building of the Berlin Wall, and a
resumption of unilateral Soviet atmospheric testing. Above
all, it was a period dominated from the Soviet point of view
by Khrushchev's failure to understand President Kennedy's
willpower and statesmanship, a failure which led to the Cuban
adventure and the collapse of Khrushchev's shortcut to alter




High on Khrushchev's military agenda from the outset was
the need to check the further strengthening of NATO, especially
since West Germany had been incorporated into the Western
defense structure. When West Germany had been taken into NATO
in May, 1955, the Soviet response, setting up the Warsaw
Alliance, hardly seemed to alter the unpalatable fact that
Germany's rearmament had become a reality. The portent of a
stronger NATO as a result of a German defense contribution
was further compounded by a series of moves designed to put
NATO forces in Europe on an atomic footing. These steps,
prompted by a shortfall in NATO's conventional force goals,
unfolded gradually between 1954 and the end of 1957. This
move threatened to reduce the value of Soviet conventional
superiority, upon which the USSR had relied, and came at an
awkward transitional time for Khrushchev. Not only was he
consolidating his political power at home, but in the military
field too, he was becoming increasingly aware of the need for
a major overhaul of the armed forces and a review of nuclear
age military doctrine. Therefore, a further buildup of Soviet
conventional forces, which by 19 55 had reached their postwar '^
peak, could hardly have appeared to Khrushchev as an appropriate
response to a NATO nuclear threat.
In order to strengthen and modernize the Soviet strategic
delivery and defense forces, Khrushchev needed to free some
of the resources tied up in the maintenance of his massive
conventional forces. Therefore, he was more interested in
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reducing the size of the conventional ground forces than in
expanding them. Also, NATO's failure to meet the ambitious
force goals set at Lisbon in 1952 doubtless reassured
Khrushchev that Soviet conventional forces could be trimmed
back somewhat without harm. Meanwhile, Soviet missile tech-
nology in the late 1950 's was more advanced than the West's,
and this new element in the strategic picture held great
promise of enhancing the Soviet nuclear posture. Though
Khrushchev was late to find that he had overestimated the
bargaining power of his missile technology, the early deploy-
ment of MRBM's in Europe did give Khrushchev some grounds for
the missile euphoria which apparently colored his outlook for
a time. [19]
Indeed, Khrushchev banked heavily on the Soviet lead in
missile technology to offset NATO's emergent tactical nuclear
posture, and this was one of two main elements which influenced
the military development of the Warsaw Pact: the first, the
effects of Khrushchev's "missiles and rockets" policy and the
second, the appointment of Marshal A. A. Grechko as the Pact's
second Commander-in-Chief. The main element of Khrushchev's
new defense policy, with its emphasis on nuclear missile tech-
nology, was that only those elements of the Soviet armed forces
which were in a position to influence the initial phases of
a war, the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Long-Range Air Force,
the strategic arm of the Submarine Fleet, and the Air Defense
Command of the Homeland CPVO STRANY) should receive priority
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in manpower and resource allocation. Other force components
including the ground forces, the Tactical Air Force, and the
surface Navy would only be used in the follow-up phase of a
nuclear war, and in the case of the ground forces, would
mainly be employed in "mopping-up" operations. [20]
In a landmark speech to the Supreme Soviet in January,
1960, Khrushchev unveiled this "new look" military policy,
spelling out his view of the requirements for a Soviet defense
policy and structure in the nuclear missile age. He stressed
that nuclear weapons and missiles had become the main elements
in a modern war, and that many types of traditional armed
forces were rapidly becoming obsolete. He noted the probable
decisiveness of the initial phase of any future war, implying
that a nuclear war would be of short duration. Finally, he
expressed confidence that the "imperialist camp" would be
deterred by this new Soviet military might, and then capped
his presentation by announcing that the Soviet armed forces
could be reduced by about one-third with no loss of combat
capability. It would seem, from the contents of this speech
that Khrushchev had turned to a "technological solution" to
the Soviet bloc's defense problems in a way similar to that
favored by the Western Alliance under the Eisenhower
administration. [21]
Unfortunately, the greater part of the Soviet military
establishment opposed Khrushchev's "one-sided" military
doctrine. Many Soviet officers could not support his
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relegation of Russia's traditional strategic arm, the ground
forces, to a non-strategic role. However, the resistance to
Khrushchev's ideas by the traditionalist marshals, as well as
the pressures of Khrushchev's decision to confront President
Kennedy over Berlin in 1961, brought about various "modifica-
tions" in the military prescription outlined by Khrushchev
before the Supreme Soviet. In particular, the measures actually
taken under Khrushchev with regard to Soviet theater forces
bore the mark of compromise rather than his personal preference.
The measures taken represented only a minor thinning out of
the theater forces deployed in foirward positions in Eastern
Europe. The most radical reform which did occur, was the
initiation of a whole series of programs, taking up where
Stalin had left off, to modernize and "nuclearize" the
theater forces. Great stress was placed on developing greater
battlefield mobility and firepower, with massive conventional
artillery supplanted to a great extent by tactical missiles
employing nuclear warheads. [22]
Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact entered the second
stage under Khrushchev around 1960-61, coincident with the
reorganization of Soviet forces discussed above. The Soviets
now began to stress closer military cooperation with East
European countries and measures were initiated to improve the
collective military efficiency of the Pact forces. This new
policy, in contrast to Khrushchev's initial Warsaw Pact policy,
had the effect of further upgrading the Pact forces in terms
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of the common defense of the Communist Camp, it served to
elevate the importance of the contributions of the non-Soviet
Pact countries in over-all planning, it extended the mission
of the East European forces from primary emphasis on defense
to an active joint role in defensive and offensive theater
operations; and lastly, it promoted joint training and re-
equipment of the Pact forces commensurate with their enlarged
responsibilities. [23]
This decision to strengthen the military functions of the
Warsaw Pact first became visible at the March, 1961 meeting
of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) , where the mem-
ber states agreed on regular consultative meetings of national
defense ministers, joint multinational military maneuvers, and
Soviet assisted modernization of East European forces. The
first of the Warsaw Pact large-scale joint maneuvers, "Brother-
hood in Arms," was held in October-November, 1961. Sympto-
matic of earlier Russian priorities, this exercise, as most
others, involved the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia
— the northern tier — and while the initial exercises of
the early 1960 's were interpreted as political demonstrations,
by the mid-1960 's they had become serious combat training -
activities. Moreover, the Soviets now supplied the East
European forces with modern T-54 and T-55 tanks, MiG-21 and
SU-7 aircraft, and other weapons they had previously withheld
from East European arsenals. By the mid-1960 's, some East
European forces were being supplied with nuclear-capable
74

delivery vehicles, although the warheads, then as now, re-
mained under sole Soviet control. Standardization of armaments
within the Warsaw Pact was further enhanced as East European y'
states abandoned some indigenous arms production capabilities.
[24] These joint training, modernization and specialization
programs suggest that the USSR had come to take a more serious
view of the potential contribution of the East European armed
forces.
It was in this atmosphere of critical reappraisal of the
importance of the Warsaw Pact forces and of upheaval caused
by Khrushchev's daring military and political policies that
Marshal A. A. Grechko assumed command of the Warsaw Pact in
July, 1960, after having served as Commander of Soviet Ground
Forces (1957-60) , and Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany (1953-57) . Grechko has been portrayed as an
extremely ambitious man, and an experienced and forceful com-
mander of great will power and considerable intellect. After
the Second World War, when serving in Kiev, he struck up a
friendship with Khrushchev which was to serve him in good
stead in the 1960 's. Grechko proved himself an able military
administrator and field commander; and there can be no doubt
that his ability as well as his friendship with Khrushchev
led to his promotion as Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact
forces.
There is some evidence that Marshal Grechko was more
favorably disposed toward a greater role for the Warsaw Pact
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forces than was his predecessor Marshal Konev. He had wit-
nessed the buildup of the East German Army between 1956 and
1960 during his service as commander of Soviet forces there
and his advocacy of hard and "realistic" training had been a
factor behind the early Soviet-East German exercise of August
1957. It is suggested that Marshal Grechko played an important
part in persuading Khrushchev to change his initial attitudes
towards the Warsaw Pact forces. [25] It was Grechko who ex-
panded the scope of the WTO exercises to the operational and
strategic levels, developing a system of bilateral and multi-
lateral exercises which transformed the military organizations
and military capabilities of the five East European armies by
permanently drawing them into this system of joint exercises.
Marshal Grechko 's efforts to improve the readiness and ef-
fiency of the Warsaw Pact armies through frequent exercises,
and perhaps also to better their political reliability by
involving their senior officers in more responsible military
tasks, were matched by an increased recognition of their
importance in the Socialist press. Soviet and East European
sources were soon to identify the system of joint exercises
as the central focus of Pact activities. Though these sources
seldom provide accurate information about the number and
nature of these joint exercises, one Western author presents
a list of some 71 major WTO exercises for the period 1961- y
1979. [26] Both Soviet and East European sources suggest
that the number of lower-level tactical and lower-level joint
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staff exercises without the participation of troops is much
larger than the number of large-scale tactical, operational
14
and strategic maneuvers and high-level command staff exercises.
Most of our information on the WTO system of joint exercises
is limited to the period 1961 to 1974, and most of this comes
from the period after Marshal Yakubovskii was appointed Pact
Commander in 1967.
Following the first multi-national Pact exercise in Sept-
ember, 1961, Grechko's training program continued with Polish-
East German exercises in Poland, Soviet-Rumanian-Bulgarian
exercises and Soviet-Czechoslovakia-East German exercises in
1962. Separate high level Soviet-Hungarian exercises were
also held. This formed the pattern of Warsaw Pact exercises
for the period 1961-1964. However, from 1965 onwards, the
pattern changed: major exercises were held only in the ^^
"Northern tier", with the participation of Soviet, Polish,
East German and Czechoslovakian troops, while Hungary took
part in only one major exercise, "Ultava" in 1966. No signif-
icant exercises were held in the "Southern tier" after 1963,
and this was no doubt connected with the disagreements on
Warsaw Pact policy and organization that were developing
between the Rumanians and the Soviets. In contrast, exercises
14The Helsinki accords of 1975 require both NATO and the
WTO to report only those exercises involving more than 25,000
troops. The result has been the Soviet reduction of the size
of most joint exercises to a figure below 25,000, as well as
a sharp reduction in the publication of all information on the
system of joint exercises. [27]
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held in the "Northern tier" were on an impressive scale, sug-
gesting that these forces, in Soviet eyes, were the first
echelon of defense or offense against NATO. Analysis of the
growing exercise and tactical training programs of the Warsaw
Pact further suggests that the armed forces deployed in the
Northern European plain have been trained to conduct defensive
or offensive operations against the West with the initial use
of nuclear and chemical weapons, or with resort to such weapons
at an early stage of a campaign. In the words of a standard
Soviet work on strategy, "One must regard the conduct of
military operations with nuclear weapons as being the basic
version. Troops must be primarily trained for such an
operation." [28]
A most peculiar aspect of Grechko ' s system of joint exer-
cises is that these exercises, involved a series of rapidly
dispersed troop movements and tactical nuclear strikes, to-
gether with political rallies, friendship meetings, concerts,
and visits to sites of cultural and historic interest. Soviet
and East European sources have paid particular attention to
the military-political aspects of the joint exercises, and
began reporting these political activities as early as 1962.
The primary purpose of the political activities in the joint
exercises was legitimizing the military-political axioms of
joint defense of the gains of Socialism against external and
internal enemies. The themes of the political activities of
the exercises were drawn from the "shared" military-political
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axioms of the WTO and the military histories of each Pact
member, jointly written by Soviet and East European historians,
which includes a 35-volume "Library of Victory" series which
examines the joint Soviet-East European struggle against
facism. The joint political activities seek to cultivate
feelings of proletarian internationalism among the multinational
personnel of the Warsaw Pact.
According to Soviet sources, representatives of the main
political administrations of the participating armies form a
unified group which organizes meetings among the "fraternal"
troops, meetings of the soldiers with the local population,
and plans programs of "agitation propoganda" and "cultural
enlightenment." This group also supervises a joint press
center, a joint multilingual newspaper published for use
during the exercises, joint multilingual radio broadcasts, and
a joint cinematography group. The highest ranking party,
state, and military officials of the host country participate
in the political meetings with the soldiers, and in joint
meetings of soldiers and civilians in factories, farms and
towns. As an example, during the "Brotherhood in Arms" exer-
cise of 1970 in the GDR, there were more than 4 meetings of
allied military units, more than 200 political rallies involv-
ing soldiers and civilians, and more than 300 cultural
programs. [29]
The political activities of the Joint exercises focus on
demonstrating the necessity of a multinational military
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alliance and on justifying multinational maneuvers on the
"sovereign soil" of individual Pact countries. As one Soviet
editorial put it: "Yes, the soldiers of the fraternal armies
speak in different languages, but they think in the same way.
In this regard they are like brothers . , , and they understand
and recognize that the older brother in this family is the
Soviet soldier ... ."[30] There are, however, historical
reasons for the individual Pact members to have less than fond
memories of "big brother." The Soviet Union's goal, and so
the goal of these political activities is to arm the soldiers
of the WTO against such memories and against other attacks on
the political axioms for joint defense of the gains of
socialism.
The Warsaw Pact system of joint exercises initiated by
Marshal Grechko also provided for the reentry of Soviet and
other WTO troops into the territories of the three East Euro-
pean countries where Soviet troops were not permanently sta-
tioned in 1961 (Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria) . The
different histories of bilateral Soviet-East European relations
after 1961 correponds closely to the different decisions made
by these East European states on their continued participation
in the joint exercises. The periodic WTO maneuvers in Czecho-
slovakia certainly enhanced the Soviet capability for a rapid
and massive occupation of Czech soil, while simultaneously pre-
empting the development of any meaningful Czech system of
territorial defense. Rumania, like Czechoslovakia, agreed to
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conduct joint WTO exercises on its territory, but after 1963,
never again permitted WTO maneuvers on Rumanian soil. Given
that these exercises involved ground forces, air forces, naval
forces, and airborne troops in a "defensive battle for the
seizure of the sea coast and also for the conduct of actions
in mountains and forest areas," the Rumanians correctly con-
cluded that these exercises were not intended primarily as
preparation for battles with NATO, and were not in their best
interest. [31] After these early joint exercises, Soviet- ^
Rumanian relations cooled rapidly.
Most importantly, under Marshal Grechko, the High Command
of the Warsaw Pact forces took shape as an administrative and
coordinating agency for the East European armies. In many
ways it resembled the traditional European "war office" which
administered forces, but did not command them in time of war.
[32] Analyses of Soviet military personalities associated with
the Warsaw Pact in the early 1960 's suggests that the main
staff continued to be headed by a First Deputy Chief of the
Soviet General Staff, (though it achieved some degree of
independence from that Staff) , and operated more as a "Chief
Directorate" of the Soviet Ministry of Defense (yet it was
still tightly controlled by the Soviet Ministry) . For all the
improvements in the military capabilities of the East European
armed forces achieved through the framework of the Warsaw Pact
and its system of joint exercises, there is no indication that '^





The importance of the administrative functions of the Warsaw
Pact High Command was underlined in Soviet Marshal Sokolovski '
s
book Military Strategy ^ published in 1962. In wartime, Marshal
Sokolovski wrote, "operational units, including armed forces
of different socialist countries, can be created to conduct
joint operations in military theaters. The command of these
forces can be assigned to the Supreme High Command of the
Soviet Armed Forces, with representation of the Supreme High
Commands of the Allied Countries." [33J He went on to stress
that the Warsaw Pact forces could operate in peacetime under
national command, but in the event of a major operation involv-
ing several of the Pact's armies, it was clear that command
would be exercised by the Soviet "Stravka" (General Headquarters)
This was exactly the command arrangement the USSR used at the
end of World War II, and it was also the pattern followed in the
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Consequently, there has
been little evidence of progress toward meaningful command
integration through the Warsaw Pact institutions themselves.
The only fully integrated armed forces branch in the Soviet
bloc was the Air Defense System, and that was created prior to
the WTO by incorporating East European air defense systems into
the Soviet PVO Strany. Knowledgeable former East European
military officers have confirmed this absence of an independent
Warsaw Pact Command and operational capability through the
late 1960's.
Despite its elaborate formal structure, the WTO, unlike
NATO, lacks functional military organs. As noted, the WTO
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lacks an integrated conunand-and-control authority, but addi-
tionally it lacks an independent logistical system. The logis-
tical build-up for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 196 8 was
carried out exclusively by Soviet supply services under the
direction of the Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense for the
Rear Services. All available information on the structure and
organization of the military side of the Warsaw Pact since the
early 1960 's suggests that in carrying out its task of admin-
istering and coordinating the combat readiness of the East
European armed forces, and supervising their political loyalty
and reliability, the Main Staff relies heavily on the Soviet
Military Missions established in all the Warsaw Pact capitols,
whose members are believed to have wide powers of inspection
and authority to supervise all national training programs.
Also, links between the Warsaw Pact and the Permanent Com-
mission for the Coordination of Military Industries of the
Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) suggest that the Pact
plays a part in the equipment and weapons standardization of
the East European armed forces.
The Soviet effort to infuse the Warsaw Pact with military
content after 1960 would seem explicable in both political and
military terms. After the disruption of East Europe in late
1956, Khrushchev sought to construct a "viable" socialist
commonwealth that would still ensure Soviet control over the
broad activities of domestic and foreign policies of the region
On the one hand, the Soviet Union dismantled or mitigated the
more onerous forms of Soviet control identified with the
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Stalinist era, permitting some national autonomy, while on the
other hand, the USSR attempted to use Comecon and the WTO as
institutional mechanisms for ensuring the stability of Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. Particularly in light of
Khrushchev's new military doctrine, reconstructing the WTO
could be viewed as a means for reducing the traditional Soviet
combined-arms forces in order to initiate his nuclear revolu-
tion in Soviet military organization and doctrine. Khrushchev's
conception evidently postulated that Soviet ground forces could
be reduced if East European armed forces were to assume a more
substantial role. As part of Khrushchev's vision, the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces were organized in 1960, and the goal
of strategic equality with the United States was vigorously
pursued. However, the combination of heightened East-West
tension in Europe over Berlin in 1961, and the traditionalist
institutional opposition within the Soviet military establish-
ment halted Khrushchev's premature bid for strategic superior-
ity, contributing to his fall from power in October, 1964.
C. BREZHNEV 1968-
Khrushchev's use of institutional mechanisms to maintain
political cohesion within the Soviet orbit while seeking to
strengthen the socialist bloc, tended to drive it further apart.
For instance, Khrushchev's plans for the development of supra-
national organs in Comecon led Rumania to assert its economic
independence from the USSR, which was followed by an explicit
assertion of political independence and, as suggested, Soviet
84

intentions concerning the Warsaw Pact led Rumania to buttress
further its political position by asserting its autonomy in
15
military affairs. By capitalizing on the Sino-Soviet dispute,
as well as Yugoslavia's earlier break, Rumania was able to
force a return to a smaller, more nationally oriented military
establishment, while simultaneously increasing its national
(dissenting) voice in WTO affairs. In November of 1964, the
Rumanians reduced the length of compulsory military service
from two years to 16 months. This decision was reported to
have provoked a visit by Marshal Grechko to Bucharest, in which
the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief tried unsuccessfully to
force the Rumanians to abandon their plan.
The years immediately following Khrushchev's dismissal were
politically turbulent for the Pact. Rumanian and Czechoslovakian
dissent had created such discord that Brezhnev spoke twice on
the need to improve the Warsaw Pact's organization and methods
of operation. In September, 1965, he said, "The current situa-
tion places on the agenda the further perfecting of the Warsaw
Pact organization." [34] The new leadership's concern with
deficiencies in the organization suggest that existing machinery
was proving incapable of meeting Soviet political imperatives,
particularly involving Rumanian behavior, which the Soviets
were keen to eliminate. However, it was the Czechoslovakian
dissent which tipped the scales and forced a return to older.
In June, 1966, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai, who was not
welcome in Eastern Europe at that time, was received in Rumania.
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more reliable methods of controlling Eastern Europe. As early
as July, 1966, a Czech journal pointed out that the different
economic/ social and cultural development of the Warsaw Pact
states contained the seeds of disintegration, pointing out that
militarily, the organization of the Warsaw Pact High Command
did not fully express a representation based on "equal rights."
[35]
As suggested, Rumanian deviance alone did not account
totally for the breakdown of progress after 1965 toward the
Soviet goal of creating a permanent political-military coordina-
tion mechanism in their Eastern European sphere. The lack of
progress suggests a certain amount of neutrality or support
for the Rumanian position from some or perhaps all of the
remaining East European states. Certainly Czechoslovakian
support for the Rumanian grievances was voiced well before the
"spring" of 1968. However, none of these basic disagreements,
which surfaced in the mid-1960 's within the Pact, had been
resolved when the Czechoslovakian crisis burst upon the East
European scene, and though this important event will be dis-
cussed in detail in the next chapter, there are some points
concerning Soviet military policy towards the Pact which bear
attention.
In 1968, as a reformist political movement headed by
Alexander Dubcek gained ground in Czechoslovakia, dissatisfac-
tion with Soviet domination of the Czech armed forces and the
WTO military institutions was voiced openly. Czechoslovakian
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military spokesmen openly criticized the submergence of Czech
national military doctrine into the common, Soviet dominated,
WTO doctrine. They reiterated most of the earlier Rumanian
criticism with great "bluntness," which surely was a contribut-
ing factor in the Soviet decision to intervene militarily in
order to halt the "peaceful counter-revolution" that was, in
the Soviet view, threatening to remove Czechoslovakia from
the Soviet orbit.
From a military point of view, the most interesting feature
of the Czech crisis was that the Warsaw Pact military staff and
organizations faded out of the picture as military preparations
for the invasion progressed. The Warsaw Pact High Command was
not involved in either the logistics or the Command-and-Control
(signals) exercises which preceded the invasion, and its Com-
mander-in-Chief did not assume command of the invading forces.
The logistics preparations had been completed in the Soviet
exercise "Nieman" on July 24th, and General Shtemenko's "signal
exercise" in early August established the command-and-control
network for the invasion. The conclusion here is that the
Czech crisis showed that the Warsaw Pact High Command had a
strictly coordinating, administrative function and was not a
command-and-control authority.
In the wake of the Czech experience, Soviet planners were
less ready to place much political reliability on the East y
European armed forces, to whom the Soviet military doctrine
had given increasing importance since the early 1960 's.
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Consequently, Soviet military forces were increased so that in
1978, there were five more Soviet divisions in East and Central
Europe than there had been in 1967, and the weaponry at the
disposal of the present 31 divisions had been considerably
upgraded. This increase of Soviet military strength in Eastern
Europe is all the more significant when viewed against a simul-
taneous emphasis on building up general purpose forces on the
Chinese border.
However, presumptive doubts about East European loyalty
after 1968 not withstanding, the Soviet Union has by no means i^
abandoned East European military credibility. Since the Czech
crisis, manpower levels have remained roughly constant, total- ^^
ing over one million regular military personnel. Increases in
defense spending devoted primarily to modernization of the
armed forces have occurred, with defense expenditures largely
in proportion to national income, (see Figures 3.1, a-c) , except
in the GDR, whose defense expenditures have been markedly
increasing. This modernization appears also to have been
emphasized mainly in the Northern tier members. Participation
of East European armed forces in Warsaw Pact joint exercises
has continued, as has additional arms transfers including T-62 W^
medium tanks, and advanced MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft. [36]
The import of the East European contribution to the Warsaw Pact
is indicated by the fact that in 1974 East European forces
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The invasion of Czechoslovakia did solve the short-term
problem of the Dubcek liberal experiment, but it did not resolve
pre-crisis disagreements over rights and privileges of the non-
Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, and the role of the Pact as
a genuine forum for discussion and debate. One might have
expected the Brezhnev leadership to return to its pre-1968
plans for strengthening the WTO as a mechanism of Soviet mili-
tary control in Eastern Europe. However, it does not appear
that the Brezhnev leadership returned directly to this policy.
Six months after the Czech invasion, the Political Consultative
Committee met (for two hours), in Budapest on March 26, 1969,
apparently to give formal approval to documents on measures to
strengthen the Pact. The communique issued following the meet-
ing indicated that the PCC ratified organizational changes in
the Pact's military institutions. These changes were not the
result of a "crash" Soviet effort to recover after Czecho-
slovakia, but appear to be a belated response to the early
Rumanian and Czech pressures to improve access to and to gain
at least a consultative voice in Warsaw Pact military affairs.
[37]
The formal structure of the WTO military organization, in-
corporating the Budapest institutional changes, are outlined
in Figure 3.2. Briefly, a Committee of Defense Ministers was
formally constituted as the supreme consultative organ of the
alliance; second, the Joint Command of the WTO joint armed









































































National Defense now replaced National Defense Ministers as
Deputy WTO Commanders; third, a military council was estab-
lished as a new body, though little information is available
about its function, it is suggested that it serves as a con-
sultative organ of the WTO ' s senior military officers: fourth,
under the Joint Command, a permanent joint staff was estab-
lished with representation proportional to manpower and defense
budget shares of the individual states: fifth, a new organ
was established at Budapest concerned with weapons development;
responsible for coordinating the production of new weapons and
military research and development: Lastly, a new statute for
the Soviet armed forces was adopted, which has led to specula-
tion that multilateral or even supranational integrated armed
forces had been created within the framework of the WTO. This
"new" system proposed to give East European states a formal
position in WTO command institutions while at the same time
reinforcing the principle of national control over national
armed forces.
These new "command channels" however, did not really en-
hance the importance of the WTO military bodies because Soviet
military planning still assumed that, in the event of hostili-
ties. East European armed forces in key battle zones will be
automatically incorporated directly into Soviet "fronts" com-
manded by the Soviet General Staff via theater or field head-
quarters. Again, this was the command arrangement utilized
by the Soviets during the Second World War, and is the command
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arrangement mentioned in the latest, most authoritative Soviet
treatises on military strategy and doctrine. (Sokolovskii '
s
On Military Strategy , 3rd edition, 1968.) In spite of the
Budapest reforms, the WTO military organization is still
analogous to the traditional European War Office, which does
not have direct resDonsibility for the conduct of military
operations. This "arrangement" makes a greater East European
voice in the WTO military institutions irrelevant to a real
military partnership, even a junior one, with the Soviet Union.
Any structural accommodations to East European desires will
certainly be set aside in the event of military hostilities.
There is no real evidence that suggests that the new, post-
Czech WTO institutions enhance the Warsaw Pact's wartime
importance.
Not withstanding the Budapest refoinns, the fact of Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe is still beyond question. Apart
from the disparity in the sizes of the Soviet and East European
military establishments, some 31 Soviet divisions, (about half
of which are tank divisions), constituting four "groups," are
stationed in the four "northern" East European countries.
16
The "Southern tier" generally consists of the three south-
ernly components of the Warsaw Pact, as opposed to the "iron
triangle" of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which compose
the Northern tier. Whether Hungary can be included in the
"Southern tier" or "Northern tier" is a moot point. By Soviet
insistence it is not part of the "Northern tier" because it is
not part of the "central front" order of battle. I have chosen
to regard Hungary as part of the "Northern tier" based upon the
very different Soviet attitude toward dissent in Hungary as
opposed to that in Rumania, upon the continued stationing of
significant Soviet forces in Hungary, and because historically,
Hungary was not considered to be a "Balkan" state.
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These four groups consist of (GSFG) (Group of Soviet Forces
Germany, (20 divisions). Northern Group, (Poland, 2-3 divisions).
Central Group, (Czechoslovakia, 5 divisions) , and Southern
Group, (Hungary, 4 divisions) . (It is also important to note
that this forward deployed force can be reinforced at short ,
notice from the eight armies with some 3 additional divisions
from the western Soviet military districts.) The arrangement
of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe underscores the bifurcation
of the WTO into the two "tiers." The key military and political
region of Eastern Europe has always been and remains the central
European plain, most particularly the German States. In con-
trast, the Balkans are a secondary political and military area.
Consequently, Soviet energies have been concentrated on improv-
ing the military capabilities and reliability of the "Northern
tier" as the "first strategic echelon." Military dominance in
the Central Front has always been regarded by Moscow as essen-
tial to the pursuit of Soviet interests in postwar Europe, and
now that the Soviet Union has attained approximate strategic
nuclear parity with the United States, Soviet doctrine has
placed increased importance on the role of local theater mili-
tary forces. In the event of military hostilities in Eastern
Europe, Soviet doctrine anticipates a rapid, massive offensive
to the West, for which a strong military position East of the
Elbe remains a prerequisite.
The fact that Czechoslovakia had been pressing privately
for substantial Pact reforms along the lines espoused more
publicly by Rumania from the early 1960 's, suggests that the
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levels of discord among the Pact members seriously jeopardized
the principle of integrated Pact forces. After 1968, in one
form or another, the central military policy issue for the
Soviets was whether to continue in the direction of integrated
forces and closer multilateral cooperation as they had since
1961, or to scrap this principle in favor of other military
arrangements in Eastern Europe. East German leaders in the
fall of 1968, even suggested the Soviets form a selective
grouping in Eastern Europe that would relegate the Pact's dis-
senting members to a secondary status. [38] Such a grouping
of Moscow's hard-core supporters could have been envisaged as
the organizational instrument for restructuring and "perfecting"
the Pact. The Soviet leadership gave no indication that it was
prepared to take up such a suggestion, or alternatively, to
fall back upon a strictly bilateral pattern of military relations
in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, despite serious East
European dissent, appears committed to the multilateral machinery
of the Warsaw Pact (and of Comecon) as the basis of exercising
its control in East Europe and of restoring and maintaining
unity in its alliance system.
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IV. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY
IN THE WARSAW PACT
A. ERA OF VIABILITY: 1956-1968
The Warsaw Treaty Organization was certainly an important
aspect of the post-Stalin leadership design to replace Stalin's
old coercive methods with new mechanisms that would enhance or
maintain the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. After 1956,
Soviet leaders, principally Khrushchev, sought to achieve this
reorientation through a combination of policies which sought
to base Soviet hegemony in several institutional forms, prin-
cipally CEMA and the WTO. Specifically, Khrushchev departed
from Stalinist conformity in quest of some new, viable Soviet-
East European relationship, which would legitimize the Communist
system in Eastern Europe. The most notable reform measures of
the Khrushchev era were those affecting economic structures,
planning and policy. However, these reforms had serious poli-
tical consequences, as departures from the old system in the
economic sphere tended to encourage pluralism in many other
branches of public life. After Khrushchev's ouster in 1964,
these developments gathered a momentum of their own. Powerful
forces of Nationalism and socio-political change were unleashed
in a bold challenge to Communist Party absolutism. Early on,
Albania took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to remove
itself from the Soviet orbit. In Rumania, national autonomy
was developed through skillful manipulation of the Sino-Soviet
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dispute and other factors, (In Czechoslovakia, domestic re-
form rushed toward repudiation of all the known variants of
the Communist system itself.) The Czech crisis itself marks
the end of the Khrushchev era and the beginning of a new period
in which Soviet policy in Eastern Europe strongly tilted back i^'
in favor of cohesion. After 1968, in the Soviet view, Eastern
Europe required the reinstitution of Communist orthodoxy as
a means of restoring the Soviet Union's position within the
Socialist system. However, this tightening was accomplished
through the institutional mechanisms which Soviet planners had
devised in the late 1950 's to replace Stalin's "personal"
methods after his passing. [1]
When Stalin died in March, 195 3, the dominance of the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe appeared fixed, with the pri-
macy of Soviet interests established and assured. However,
Stalin's death unleashed divisions among his successors, and
a crisis in the Kremlin which stirred East European dissent
back to life. Stalin may have been dead, but Stalinism was
just beginning to die. The Communist world entered a period
of great turmoil and confusion as Kremlin factions formed
amorphous groupings in the struggle for ultimate power. The
Satellites soon became drawn into the vortex of the Kremlin
intrigues as pawns, not pawns of the Soviet Union, but pawns
of the warring factional groups. Yugoslavia's defection in
1948 had marked the entrance of national Communism in the
otherwise monolithic Socialist system, and the beginning of
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a progressive erosion of Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe,
(a process which today is manifest in the current Polish labor
crisis) . The divisive and corrosive squabbles among the Soviet
leadership after Stalin's death combined to further undermine
Soviet prestige and authority. Uncertainty and hesitation in
Moscow during this succession crisis was to encourage arrogance
in Peking, further insolence in Belgrade and a general dissent
which swept Eastern Europe.
As the East European states asserted the priority of their
own national interests in one area after another, the flow of
demands and the resolution of conflicts within the Socialist
system underwent some systemic changes. The East European
satellites were successful in resisting or trimming the demands
made upon them by Moscow. CEMA, for example, which originally
facilitated the economic plundering of Eastern Europe for the
Soviets, was reorganized to control and arrest Soviet
exploitation. Shortly thereafter, it was converted into a
vehicle for drawing economic resources from the Soviet Union,
as East European states asserted their rights to receive
economic assistance, restitution and commercial autonomy from
Moscow. As these economic demands upon the Soviets spilled
over into the political and ideological realms, individual
states demanded and received greater autonomy. The extent to
which these demands were successfully asserted depended in
large measure upon the leverage exerted in each individual
case, and also upon the geo-strategic position of the dissenting
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party in the Warsaw Pact system. No overt attempt, however,
was made to organize joint or concerned action against Moscow
until 1961, when Albania and China forged an anti-Soviet
alliance. Up to that time, only the Soviet Union enjoyed the
privilege of mobilizing parties and states within the Socialist
system against unwilling, dissident members of the Communist
fraternity. [2]
While it was Tito's defection in 1948 that pointed the way,
and Stalin's death in 1953 that created the opportunity, it
was Khrushchev's denounciation of Stalin in 1956 at the Twentieth
Party Congress that gave the real impetus to pluralistic Com-
munism in Eastern Europe. (The Sino-Soviet split, the detente
with the United States as a consequence of the nuclear test
bay treaty signed in 196 3, and Khrushchev's sudden and un-
ceremonious ouster in 1964 successively accelerated this frag-
mentation of the East European bloc and created further op-
portunities for the liberalization of Communism within the
regimes.) It was the 20th Party Congress which constitutes a
major watershed in the evolution of Soviet relations with Com-
munist East Europe. Locally responsive Communists like Gomulka
of Poland and Nagy of Hungary were brought to power by the
great external pressures set in motion by the revelations of
the "crimes" of Stalin and the "evils of the personality cult"
in Khrushchev's secret speech. The demolition of Stalinism
at home resulted in the disintegration of Stalinist structures •
in Eastern Europe. The Polish and Hungarian "Octobers" were
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the immediate and most serious consequences of de-Stalinization,
The tide of nationalism sweeping across the East European
states could no longer be hidden by the smokescreen of pro-
letarian internationalism. Thus the year 1956 inaugurated the
gradual dissolution of proletarian internationalism into its
constituent Communist nationalisms, a process which unfolded
gradually and pragmatically in response to the major political,
social and economic events of the early to mid 1950 's.
The de-Stalinization policy following Khrushchev's revela-
tions at the 2 0th Party Congress removed the last political
pillars upon which the satellite leaders leaned for support
and offered national political alternatives a chance to form.
In Poland, Wladyslaw Gomulka and in Hungary, Imve Nagy, began
to be heard as voices of national Communism. But there was a
significant difference in their handlings of the situation.
Gomulka was a realistic and committed Communist, concerned
only with building Socialism his way, while Nagy did not have
the same idealogical commitment and allowed himself to be
pushed into an increasingly untenable anti-Communist, anti-
Soviet position. Yet the two revolts clarified to a great
extent the Soviet attitude toward the satellite countries, and
demonstrated what could be done within the confines of an
overall Soviet military predominance. Gomulka skillfully
gained for himself a freedom of action in domestic affairs by
recognizing Poland's basic dependence on the Soviet Union and
restricting his demands to internal affairs. The Hungarian
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revolution had no comparably coherent policy, and their attempt
to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact exhausted Soviet tolerance.
A "Poland" could be tolerated, another "Yugoslavia", never.
Unquestioned allegiance to the Warsaw Pact was henceforth to
be the keynote in determining which was one and which was the
other.
The continuing political diversity in Eastern Europe was
a consequence of de-Stalinization and one other distinct, but
closely related process: desatellization. Where de-Staliniza-
tion referred primarily to the dismantling of Stalinist insti-
tutions and practices, and closely followed the de-Staliniza-
tion which took place in the Soviet Union, desatellization
referred to the process whereby the individual countries of
Eastern Europe gradually reasserted their autonomy and greater
independence from Soviet control, (a process that is still
continuing) . At an early point in the evolution of East
European Communism the two processes came into conflict. In
particular, some East European Communists could hardly afford
the luxury of de-Stalinization (too much had been done in the
name of Stalin) . Worse, the practical result of this rehab-
ilitation would be to free a large, obviously hostile element
into an already festering political situation. Some countries
thus asserted their independence in order to retain certain
Stalinist institutions and to resist their complete dismantling.
In Albania, as an example, the desatellitization resulted in
the intensification of Stalinist norms rather than a greater
103

internal liberalization. De-Stalinization was, in effect, a
process of internal liberalization, a process that progressed
at varying tempos in Eastern Europe. The extent to which the
individual countries were left to grapple with their own
liberalization was more a function of geo-strategic concerns
(of the Soviets) than of ideological concerns. The two most
independent countries of Eastern Europe, which reflect the
two opposite tendencies with respect to Stalinism, Albania
and Yugoslavia, are also less strategic members of the South-
ern tier.
The terms "de-Stalinization" and "desatellization, " how-
ever, do not accurately describe the total political processes
which took place in Eastern Europe. Both processes were trans-
itional episodes in the drive for greater internal and external
autonomy. De-Stalinization moved into a process of de-Sovietiza-
tion, which in Hungary at least eventuated de-Communization.
Desatellization implied neutralization at best, or at worst, a
withdrawal from the Soviet alliance system which could even-
tually culminate in a reversal of alliances, either develop-
ment being very unpalatable to the Soviets. All of these
fears, which have been candidly and repeatedly expressed by
Moscow, factor into Soviet calculations of East European and
thus Warsaw Pact policy.
It was the absence of any common or universal criteria
of what constituted "Socialism" after Khrushchev's denouncia-
tion of Stalin that created a wide area of ambiguity which
caused much anxiety in Communist circles. What started out
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as de-Stalinization was soon legitimized in the doctrine
"separate roads to Socialism." It quickly became evident that
the "separate roads" doctrine created logical and practical
opportunities for subverting and displacing the Socialist
norms established by the Soviet Union. Thus was born the
Soviet equivalent of the "falling dominoes" theory: de-
Stalinization led to "separate roads," which proliferated
into "national deviations," which in turn inspired "modern
revisionism," which was a prelude to "social democracy" that
quickly degenerated into "bourgeois democracy" and the "re-
storation of capitalism." [3] The question remained as to
when in this process of "creeping" counter-revolution the
Soviets might intervene. From an ideological view, this
"falling dominoes" theory runs contrary to the natural dia-
lectic of political history which is crucial to Soviet
thought. (From recent history it might appear that the Soviet
"threshold of intolerance" lies at some point between "modern
revisionism" and "social democracy." If the pattern of inter-
vention used in Czechoslovakia in 1968 is repeated in Poland
in 1981, then this might provide some clear-cut criteria for
predicting when the Soviets might forcibly intervene in this
anti-dialectic process.)
The Warsaw Pact, which followed its economic counterpart
CEMA by some six years, was established partly as an expression
of modern (nuclear) strategy but also as the expression of a
political perspective in Eastern Europe that would allow Soviet
policy to succeed. The death of Stalin had not brought about
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a change in the existing power structure within the Soviet
bloc, but it had, as suggested, brought about a relaxation of
certain economic tensions, accounting for regional variations.
However, serious political consequences were inevitable as
national political alternatives were given a chance to be heard.
The extreme personalization of relations within the bloc,
once a source of great strength, became a source of great
weakness. A new effectiveness was needed in East European
policy, and so Khrushchev, once he had secured his position
at the head of Soviet government, initiated a policy charac-
terized by a desire to legitimize intra-bloc relations. As
noted, bilateral ties had existed since the end of the Second
World War, but there did not exist a multilateral system to
make the bloc appear as a cohesive whole. Bilateralism had
obviously failed to achieve any real unity or a sense of
identification of East European interests with Soviet interests,
and a new system had to be created to ensure a stronger Soviet
position. After both world wars, ideas for some sort of
federation or defense organization against a resurgent Germany
had been bandied about both in the Soviet Union and among the
states of Eastern Europe. [4] The Warsaw Pact was a Soviet
compromise between bilateralism and federation, and became the
epitome of the new Soviet policy.
Since Stalin's death, the main aim of Soviet policy in
Eastern Europe appears to be one of achieving the right
combination of cohesion and viability. For nearly four years
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after his death, there was no consistent Soviet policy in
Eastern Europe, primarily because of the leadership divisions
and struggles in Moscow. Above simple palliatives, measures
were needed to cope with the rising tide of crisis within the,
Soviet-East European sphere. This reality became apparent
almost immediately in the Pilsa and East Berlin riots of 1953.
The Soviet response was to initiate economic and political con-
cessions collectively known as the "new course," but these
were essentially reactions to the unstable situation left by
Stalin, rather than indications of any fundamental new ideas
in Moscow. Little was added to the East European system that
amounted to anything like a "new system."
The result of the 195 6 revolutions was obvious Soviet dis-
illusionment with multilateralism as a policy, and a shift back
toward bilateralism as exemplified by the status-of-forces
agreements with the satellite countries initiated by the
Soviets in the months immediately following. The agreement
with Poland was particularly significant, for the Soviet Union
was obliged to grant Gomulka a domestic autonomy which several
months earlier would not have seemed possible. Implicit in
this was the willingness of the Soviet Union to regard as a
sovereign state, capable of constructing Communism in its own
way, any country which was considered a loyal member of the
Warsaw Pact.
However, Eastern Europe did undergo a period of apparent
consolidation, both militarily and politically, until the early
1960 's, with the 1^0 in the background as a point of reference
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rather than as an iininediate instrument of policy. The notion
of the Soviet Union as "primus inter-pares" was stressed, and
there was a reliance on ideological commitment, but one more
progressively responsive to the needs of the other bloc
countries. Inter-state relations assumed a more traditional
form, while Party ties were extensively cultured and emphasized.
As a result, the Political Consultative Committee of the War-
saw Pact met only twice between January 1956 and February 1960,
(see Figure 4.1) and was replaced by infoirmal meetings of Party
leaders which offered greater opportunities for exerting subtle
pressures. [5]
Khrushchev's attempts to create a cohesive, viable system
in Eastern Europe and his only partial success are well known.
Against a theoretical background of newly enumerated prin-
ciples of equality governing relations between Socialist states,
Khrushchev saw the institutions of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA
as the tools to weld a new and firmer cohesion between the
Soviet Union and the East European states. Khrushchev, much
more than his predecessor and his successors, stressed the
viability aspect over the cohesion aspect of Soviet policy.
Whether he or others in the Kremlin consciously believed that
the greater the viability, the greater the cohesion, or whether
he envisaged a unity between the two, dialectical or otherwise,
is difficult to say. But whatever the inadequacies of his
conceptualization, Khrushchev, directly at home and indirectly
in Eastern Europe, pursued policies and generated an atmosphere
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of a viability aimed at making the Communist system more at-
tractive and more legitimate.
The autonomy the Eastern European states developed as a
result of Khrushchev's policies served to quicken the stimulus
for change at the domestic level and the degree of change
varied from state to state. Many factors affected this; per-
haps the most important were the levels of economic advance-
ment, public pressure and the degree of self-confidence of the
ruling elite. Of all of Khrushchev's reform measures which
furthered this process in Eastern Europe, the most notable,
were those affecting economic structure, planning and policy.
Nearly every country was affected by these measures, and in
view of the close interaction between Khrushchev's leadership
and East European reform, it was hardly coincidental that the
"go-ahead signal" for them was given by the publication of
the Liberman proposals in the Soviet Union in 1962. Reform
blueprints for a series of measures for greater economic ef-
ficiency subsequently appeared in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
East Geinnany and Poland, even the Bulgarian and Rumanian
leaders were constrained to make some efforts at piecemeal
change.
These economic reform measures — again as an illustration
of growing diversity — met with different fates in different
countries. In East Germany and Hungary they achieved great
success; in Czechoslovakia they were one more ingredient which
contributed to the heady mixture of reformist political
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transformation of the Prague Spring in 1968; in Bulgaria they
were hardly given the chance to operate before they were
withdrawn. But just as important as their degree of success
or failure were their effects on the poltical and social lives
of the countries involved. Even the more cautious of these
economic reforms, because they departed from the old command
economic system, tended to further encourage pluralism in the
other branches of public life. This is what bold and percep-
tive East European reformers realized and sought to accelerate.
As the amount of "leeway" grew out of this interaction, so
the Party's united and total control over public life tended
to diminish. The development of pluralism in some East Europ-
ean states was a reality of increasing importance in the
1960's. [6]
The period of the 1960 's marks the Warsaw Pact's entry into
a new phase, broadly described as military progress side-by-
side a political awakening of its non-Soviet members. While
the military development of the Warsaw Pact's forces proceeded
at a steady pace, the political processes of the Pact began to
show signs of stress and in some cases, genuine fatigue. This
period had witnessed a rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, puncutated by Khrushchev's sudden withdrawal of Soviet
military aid to Peking in July, 1960. The Soviet leaders
appeared to be on the defensive in discussions on the political
role of the Warsaw Pact, pressing for visible signs of renewed
Communist unity under Soviet leadership in the face of a
determined Chinese ideological threat. At the center of the
112

dispute was Peking's charge that Moscow's behavior was solely
determined by the interests of a "revisionist clique," and
that Soviet violations of the principles of "proletarian inter-
nationalism" had subverted the underlying theoretical basis
of the world Communist movement and system. By subverting
ideological interests to Soviet state interests in Eastern
Europe, the Soviets tended to confirm the Chinese view. How-
ever, the Sino-Soviet conflict enabled the states of Eastern
Europe to play off the two Communist giants against one another
in a bid to achieve further national autonomy. Albania was
the first to use the Sino-Soviet split to separate herself
from Soviet paternalism. Next, Rumania was able to secure a
large measure of autonomy by offering herself as a "neutral"
mediator in the conflict. The atmosphere of uncertainty and
hesitation created by this Russian-Chinese antipathy came to
encourage further dissidence in Eastern Europe.
The Sino-Soviet dispute and the rise of Chinese influence
in Eastern Europe dates to the mid-1950 's. Rumanian feelers
for Chinese support on ideological formulations have been
documented as early as 1954. Though Chinese claims that they
exercised some influence in the Soviet decisions to tolerate
the outcome of the Polish October and to intervene militarily
to end the Hungarian counterrevolution during the crisis of
1956, are probably overstated, Peking was by that time actively
involved in East European politics as one aspect of Mao's
effort to "reconstruct a Communist center." As noted, late in
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1956 and early in 1957, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai visited
several East European capitols. He came preaching unity and
criticizing the Soviet leadership. (According to the Chinese,
Chou En-Lai criticized Khrushchev for failing to consult with
other Communist Parties before denouncing Stalin at the 20th
Party Congress.) As later events of the Sino-Soviet dispute
made more explicit, the Chinese wanted a voice in how the
"leadership of the camp" would be exercised — which in retro-
spect, amounted to at least a veto power.
Meanwhile, Khrushchev, challenged by the "anti-party" group,
retaining his position by virtue of frantic domestic maneuver-
ing, was in a time of troubles. His policies to create co-
hesion in Eastern Europe had backfired and his (1955-56) attempt
at rapproachment with Yugoslavia was failing. Under pressure
from Rumania and Peking, the Soviets were being "forced" to
withdraw their forces stationed in Rumania under the Warsaw
treaty. China's perceptions of its East European possibilities
now began to expand along Rumanian lines. The success of
Chinese efforts to maneuver Soviet troops out of Rumania pro-
vided an indispensable beginning for subsequent foreign policy
deviations from "jointly coordinated" initiatves by other
Warsaw Pact members.
Not all early Chinese-East European contacts had such
visible results, but the volume of the exchange increased
markedly. During 1958, an estiamted 108 Chinese delegations
visited East European capitols and 150 East European delega-
tions went to Peking. These exchanges were made in a context
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of wide East European media coverage of Chinese interal develop-
ments that carried implications for ideological innovations in
these Communist countries. The "Hundred Flowers" period of
1957, the "Great Leap Forward," and the reorganization of
China into "people's communes" aroused East European interest.
This spreading of Peking's influence into an area long held as
a national Soviet "preserve" undoubtedly combined with other
undesirable implications of the Chinese challenge to further
the Soviet lack of enthusiasm for the Chinese Communists in
general. [7]
By 1960, the Sino-Soviet dispute, as yet a non-issue to
Western analysts, was a fact of political life in interparty
relations, Poland, for example, mistakenly construed the
brief blooming of the "Hundred Flowers" as a Chinese willing-
ness to "support our efforts aimed in the direction outlined
in October." Chinese approval of Poland's desire for diver-
sity was about the last thing likely, given Peking's prefer-
ence for a collective appearance on ideological matters.
The degree to which East European hopes focused on China as an
alternative to Soviet hegemony was an important part of the
evolution of East European/Warsaw Pact-Soviet relations whether
or nor East European hopes were real or false.
The impact of the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict involved
East Europe and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in more than
one dimension. First, East European forums served as a stag-
ing ground from which the principles gingerly played their
hands. At the February, 1960 PCC meeting, the Chinese
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observer's speech provided a militant contrast to the otherwise
moderate tone of the official Pact (Soviet) declaration. At
the Rumanian Party Congress in June 1960, hostilities broke
into open, bitter debate between Khrushchev and the head of
the Chinese delegation, P ' eng Chen. The Soviet leader not
only attacked the Chinese, but reportedly issued a long letter
to other Parties, detailing Peking's ideological shortcomings.
The Chinese reply, surprisingly moderate compared with later
such pronouncements, showed little willingness to recant or to
even retreat on the issues dividing the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic. As the crisis went on, the East European
Party leaders were increasingly aware of the dispute in which
they, like it or not, were becoming more and more involved.
Second, both Moscow and Peking had reasons for wanting to keep
an awareness of their differences within Communist circles.
Therefore, following the first wave of esoterically communicated
disagreements, came a period of surrogate struggle during which
the Soviets attacked Albania, meaning China, and the Chinese
retaliated with polemics against the Yugoslavs, meaning the
Soviets. The "shadow-boxing" continued until the 22nd Party
Congress, when Khrushchev's angry outburst against Tirana
brought open objections from Chou En-Lai on the issue that
disputes between fraternal parties should not be handled by
public censure, and that showing one's difference in the face




By 1961, Albania had split with Moscow and politically
had become an island of Chinese influence in the Balkans. The
Soviet-Albanian conflict was qualitatively different from the
1956 events in Poland and Hungary. First, although the impact
of de-Stalinization had helped to precipitate all three crises,
Stalinists retained control of the Albanian Communist party.
Second, Soviet-Albanian relations deteriorated gradually, and
with the memories of Poland and Hungary still relatively poig-
nant, the Soviets never found a convenient moment to intervene.
Third, non-Warsaw Pact members played vital roles in this con-
flict in that tensions increased in proportion to improvements
in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, with the Communist Chinese pro-
viding an alternative source of support for the Albanian cause.
This was hardly surprising, as from the beginning, Albanian
defiance was in large measure a reflection of Sino-Soviet
differences. [9]
By the June, 1962 PCC meeting, Albania, although in theory
retaining membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, had
been effectively excluded from participation within the frame-
work of the Pact. Throughout 1962 and 1963 the Soviets con-
tinued attacking Albania at a series of European Party Con-
gresses, charging that Albania's primary sin was alignment with
China against Soviet positions within the international Com-
munist movement. Albanian membership in the Warsaw Pact was
largely ignored and because the Soviets did not resort to the '
use of force, the effect of the Soviet-Albanian dispute upon
the Warsaw Pact institutionally was limited.
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Although de facto exclusion of Albanian representatives
from the WTO was the result of the dispute, Albania was never
formally expelled. The problem of Albania's relations to the
Warsaw Pact subsided into "more of the same" polemics on the
appropriate anniversaries. Within the Pact itself, speeches
ceased being published, meetings became briefer, and differ-
ences were either suppressed or handled through noninstitutional
channels. Simultaneously, the military aspects of the Treaty
predominated both in terms of activity and Soviet perceptions
of the Warsaw Pact's importance. In short, the appearance of
internal conflict had resulted in first, the suppression of
diversity, and then in the exclusion of the bulk of political
content from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Relations between
Tirana and Moscow had deteriorated to the point that diplomatic
relations had been broken off in 1961, after the 22nd CPSU
Congress, when the Albanian embassy in Moscow distributed key
Albanian documents relating to the dispute. Thereafter, the
Albanians seized the Soviet submarine base at Valena on the
Adriatic coast and played no further part in Warsaw Pact
affairs. The Soviet-Albanian dispute did not take on real
significance again until the multilateral invasion of Czecho-
slovakia precipitated Tirana's formal withdrawal from the
Warsaw Treaty Organization in September 1968. In sum, from
1963 until 1968, the Albanian question within the alliance
was placed on ice, overshadowed by Bucharest's challenge to




Rumanian cleverness in maximizing the opportunities pro-
vided by the Sino-Soviet dispute are well known, but the sub-
sequent Soviet-Rumanian maneuvering within the Pact was
principally an extension of Bucharest's rejection of supra-
national planning within the CEMA. Signs of strain in the
economic relations of Rumania with the other members of CEMA
have been dociimented as early as 19 53, with the Rumanians
openly stating their case in bloc literature in 1958. As Soviet
control in East Europe suffered the shocks of Poland and
Hungary in 1956, the falling away of Albania and potential
further ideological undermining from China, Moscow attempted
to compensate by strengthening joint institutions as organiza-
tional instruments of Soviet influence. In December, 1961
the 16th CEMA Council planners officially recommended the
principles of the "International Socialist Division of Labor"
and a number of unspecified changes. These principles were ^
then dramatically accepted by a meeting of the First Secre-
taries of the Communist parties of the member countries in
June 1962. Between December 1961 and June 1962, there ap-
peared articles reiterating East European reluctance for a
single plan encompassing the entire Socialist system. Con-
cretely, this plan meant an emphasis on integration and social-
ist division of labor within the CEMA. For Rumania, nothing
could have been more threatening, for despite major successes
in establishing some industrial infrastructure, Rumania re-
mained predominantly agricultural. Not surprisingly, Khrush-
chev's interpretation of the direction to be taken by the
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World Socialist system at that stage (one in which he consid-
ered "conditions" had "ripened" for raising economic and
political cooperation to a new and higher level) was not shared
by the Rumanian Party leadership. Khrushchev was being both
politically blunt and unambiguous about an unpalatable end
when he stated:
"
... with the emergence of Socialism beyond the
boundaries of a single country . . . the (economic)
law of planned proportional development operating
on the scale of the system as a whole calls for
planning and definite proportions both in each of
the Socialist countries taken separately and on
the scale of the entire Commonwealth." [11]
It did not take much for Rumanian Party leaders to see the
implications of this pronouncement for their country's future
economic development. Despite evident East European hesita-
tion, the Soviet leadership pushed ahead, demanding "bolder
steps toward the establishment of a single planning body for
all countries." [12]
Scant progress was made by the 17th CEMA session in
December 1962, and by the Summer of 1963, the Rumanians had
visibly moved out of line (and one step closer to the Chinese)
.
As the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified (over Albania) the
importance of Rumanian resistance to economic integration
influenced the Soviet perspective as Moscow sought support
within the bloc for an international Communist conference to
expel or at least condemn Peking. Bucharest first stalled,
and then maneuvered itself into the position of go-between.
It is doubtful that the Soviet leadership was pleased to have
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Rumania assume the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, but they accepted it, at least temporarily. When the
attempted mediation collapsed under the combined weight of
Soviet and Chinese polemics , the Rumanians dociimented their
own reflections on the process. This remarkable statement
amounted to a declaration of neutrality that made clear
Bucharest's objections and did not hesitate to draw pointed
historical analogies on the dangers of misusing Communist
organizations to referee interparty differences.
Rumania's economic strength, natural resources and strong
nationalist feelings, harnessed by an authoritative Communist
regime, had made her an important Pact critic of the Soviet
Union. As an outgrowth of Rumania's challenge to Soviet
integration plans under Comecon and her skillful management
of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Rumania came to adopt the principle
of "non-interference" in the affairs of other countries, and
from 1963 onward, began to reserve the right to make her own
decisions in foreign and defense policy (the unilateral reduc-
tion in the length of compulsory military service is an example)
.
After Khrushchev's ouster, the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev
and Kosygin evidently wished to mend fences by treating Soviet-
Rumanian tensions as a personality conflict with their "hare-
brained" predecessor. However, by that time, Bucharest had a
vested interest in "correct" socialist relations with all
disputants. Moscow continued to press for condemnation of
the Chinese, while Peking continued to encourage Rumanian
neutrality in hopes of "tilting" a second Balkan country
into the Chinese camp.
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Rumania's gradual emancipation from Soviet dominance,
which originally had been facilitated by the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Rumanian territory in 1958, was finally
symbolized by the Rumanian "declaration of Marxist independence."
This declaration, issued in April 1964 by the Rumanian Central
Committee, signalled Rumania's formal rejection of CEMA's plans
as incompatible with Rumanian national sovereignty. In addi-
tion to her opposition to supranational economic planning,
Rumania resisted the process of military integration and
centralization within the Warsaw Pact, and further insisted on
"equality" and "independence" in interparty and interstate
relations. Rumania's dissatisfaction with Warsaw Pact military
arrangements was expressed in several ways soon after Khrush-
chev's ouster. In November 1964, Rumania reduced compulsory
military service, as noted, and at about the same time Rumanian
officials spoke of the "need for new ways" of reaching deci-
sions within the Pact. [13J
Rumania's lack of enthusiasm for the Soviet interpretation
of the Pact's role as a transmission belt for Soviet orders
and as a coordinating agency for Soviet foreign policy further
aggravated the Soviet-Rumanian discord. The Rumanians seemed
to have found a loophole in the Warsaw Treaty and its organiza-
tion, which allowed them to use the Pact as a forum for open
discussion of alliance problems and also to take action on
their own interpretation of the rights and privileges of Pact
members. Some of Rumania's grievances included: (1) the
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continued domination of the military side by the Soviet Union,
y
(2) the absence of consultation procedures on the use of
nuclear weapons, and (3) the financial contributions necessary
to keep Soviet troops stationed on members' territory. (At a
preparatory meeting for the Assembly of the PCC held in Buch-
arest in July 1966, the R^imanians publicized their views and
canvassed support among the other Pact members. The subsequent
communique contained several items consistent with the Rumanian
view: CD a regard for national sovereignty, (2) equal rights
for Pact members, (3) noninterference in the affairs of other
countries, (4) a readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Pact should
NATO do the same. It is this "Rumanian interpretation" that
the Russians were keen to eliminate when in 1965 Brezhnev spoke
of "perfecting the Pact."
From the evidence available, it is difficult to determine
just how the East European countries lined up on the need for ,
organizational reform of the Pact. Two kinds of organizational
change seem to have been at issue: (1) changes in the Political \^
mechanism for coordination and enforcement of a foreign policy
line; and (2) reform of the military arrangements within the
Pact. For their part, the Soviets were interested primarily
in organizational reform in the first category, while Rumania
and her sympathizers seemed to have approached the issue of
reform from the other end. The Rumanians were interested
essentially in preserving the Pact's existing political mach-
mery (which gave the individual countries considerable lati-
tude on foreign policy matters) but with regard to the military
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coinmand structure they were pressing for sweeping reforms
intended to lessen the Soviet Union's military control.
Through the Fall of 1965, the Soviet Union evidently continued
to work behind the scenes to promote its version of organiza-
tional reform within the Warsaw Pact, but in March 1966,
Brezhnev once more called for "improving the mechanism of the
Warsaw Pact." In May 1966, Rumanian sources "revealed"
(leaked) that a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative
Committee would be held in July in Bucharest, where it could
be expected that the contending Soviet and Rumanian views on
the organization and functions of the Pact would be thrashed
out.
The Bucharest conference contributed little to Soviet
hopes of ironing out the many internal differences over the
political and military relationships within the Warsaw bloc.
The conferees endorsed neither Soviet advocacy of institutional
improvements to provide a "permanent and prompt mechanism"
for coordination of Pact policy nor the Rumanian suggestions
for the further loosening of Soviet control over the alliance
machinery. Similarly, the CEMA session tacked on at the end
of the conference failed to come to grips with the divisive
economic issues that plagued Soviet-Warsaw Pact relations.
The point of primary interest which issued from the Bucharest
Conference was a Soviet proposal for "an all-European confer-
ence" to discuss security and promote European cooperation.
The central significance of this proposal, which would have
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had wide-ranging implications for future Soviet policy in
Europe, hinged on (1) a dissolution of existing alliances in
favor of a new, all-European security arrangement, and (2) a
guarantee that the new European order would recognize the
17permanent division of Germany.
In the two years after the Bucharest Conference, the Soviet
Union was obliged to cope with progressively troublesome threats
to its control over Eastern Europe and the units of the Warsaw
bloc. These challenges began with Rumania's breaking of ranks
on a common line toward West Germany, which made more difficult
the problem of maintaining bloc cohesiveness in the face of
Bonn's ost-politik. However, it was the subsequent and per-
haps largely unforeseen events in Czechoslovakia which posed
the most serious problem for the Soviet leadership. Regarded
at the time as the gravest challenge to Soviet interests in
East Europe, Czechoslovakia's new course under the Dubcek
regime not only raised doubts as to the steadfastness of the
military and foreign policy of a key member in the Pact's
Northern tier, but in the Soviet view, it also threatened to
weaken the internal structure of Communist rule — perhaps a
more disturbing prospect.
17The backstop for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
under an all-European security system lay in the bilateral
treaty network carefully maintained by the Soviets in addi-
tion to the WTO. Under the bilateral treaty system, the
Soviet Union would be guaranteed continued military access
to Eastern Europe should the West decide to accept Soviet
calls for dismantling NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
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B. ERA OF COHESION: 1968-
The steps Khrushchev took in Eastern Europe after 1956
had ushered in the era associated with the emphasis on viable
relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the end of that
era and the beginning of a new period in which the relation-
ship between cohesion and viability was strongly tilted back
in favor of cohesion. The trauma of Czechoslovakia itself,
and the disruptive potential of the Prague Spring, had the
Soviet Union and even some parts of Eastern Europe convinced
that the spirit of innovation, experimentation and reformation
that had been abroad in Eastern Europe during the Khrushchev
era had to cease. The situation, in their view, demanded a
counter-reformation, and the reinstitution of orthodoxy as a
means of restoring control over Eastern Europe and protecting
the Soviet Union itself against the dangers inherent in the
Czech developments. 115]
It is difficult to find a label that properly describes
the evolving alliance system in East Europe to which Khrush-
chev's successors fell heir. At the time Brezhnev and Kosygin
came to power, the Soviet bloc was held together by a complex
web of ideological, economic, political and military ties.
The East European states clearly were no longer completely
subordinated to Soviet power, yet Soviet influence still set
limits upon independent national actions. Each of the East
European states was obliged to work out an "adjustment" between
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its own national aspirations and the requirements of bloc
solidarity. From the Soviet view, ever since Khrushchev gave
a green light for greater autonomy in Eastern Europe, Moscow
had found itself alternating between bilateral dealings with
the individual alliance regimes and attempts to exercise its
leadership through some multilateral form of institutionalized
unity. Even though economic integration through CEMA had
fallen flat in 1962-63, the Warsaw Pact had continued to be
"upgraded" slowly as a multilateral instrument through which -
at least military integration could be promoted. The Pact
had proved to be a limited means through which intrabloc conflict
and function could be addressed, but it remained, like CEMA,
something less than an ideal instrument for carrying out com-
mon policy issued from Moscow. Both the WTO and CEMA as multi-
lateral systems lacked effective organs for policy-making and
centralized enforcement of decisions. Authoritative policy
formulation had rested mainly with the Party leaderships who
met, as circumstances demanded, through a system of "mutual L^
concessions, conference and discussion." [16] Even then,
policy decisions were not binding and were implemented largely
by the national parties rather than through the supranational
machinery of the bloc.
Since neither bilateral nor multilateral principles for
managing Soviet relations with the other Warsaw Pact members
had proved altogether satisfactory, a third alternative was
pursued by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. The Soviet leadership
attempted to cultivate further the trend toward regional
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differentiation which had developed between the Northern tier
18
states and the Southern, or Balkan, grouping. The Northern
tier countries, which together with the Soviet Union itself,
formed what is sometimes referred to as the "first strategic
echelon" of the Warsaw Pact, were obviously of prime strategic
and political importance to Soviet European policy. Not only
did their territories lie astride what in wartime would be the
main axis of a central European campaign, but these countries
also shared the most immediate geopolitical interests against
West Germany. Thus the Soviet Union found it advantageous to
confer a privileged status upon the Northern tier countries
which received a more important regional role in Soviet mili-
tary and economic planning. However, the Soviet Union did not
institutionalize the separate status of the Northern tier,
which would have formalized yet another division in the Warsaw
Pact. This, then, was the trend in Soviet policy toward the
Pact when Brezhnev and Kosygin took office. Basically, the
decline of Soviet dominance in East Europe during the past
decade had left Khrushchev's successors with the broad choice
of either making the best of an unsatisfactory situation of
18According to one source, the idea of a northern regional
grouping with a preferential relationship with Moscow originated
with Gomulka between 1959 and 1963, and was inspired by his
concern that a bilateral Soviet-East German axis might be formed
at Poland's expense. I would suggest that the emphasis on the
Northern tier evolved more out of Soviet geostrategic con-
siderations than out of any Polish geopolitical psychosis.
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trying to reimpose Soviet will throughout the region. In the
first years of the new regime, they apparently accepted the
former alternative, following largely a conciliatory and fence-
mending line in East Europe. However, the Brezhnev-Kosygin
regime was forced to reverse itself when it called upon Pact
troops to restore Soviet authority in Czechoslovakia. [17]
None of the basic disagreements had been resolved when the
Czechoslovak crisis burst on the East European scene in the
Spring of 1968 with the publication of the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party's "Action Program" on April 9th. The Czechs
pointed out that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies did not u
enjoy a full representation based on equal rights, and urged
that the political structure of the Pact become a responsive,
systemic body. Evidence of Czech doubts were apparent as
early as 1966 when a Czech political journal pointed out that
the differing economic, social and cultural developments in the
Warsaw States contained the seeds of disintegration. There
were basic differences and disagreements on the interpretation
of the fundamental problems of revolutionary strategy and tac-
tics, and there was no unity of view on the political part of
Socialist military doctrine. They concluded that the coopera-
tion of the Socialist states was inevitably endangered and
that the military alliance could be seriously affected. The
main danger of the "Dubcek era" was the loss of orthodox Com-
munist Party control over the country and the threat that
"counter-revolutionaries" would drive a wedge into the heart
of the Warsaw Pact area.
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Soviet attempts to reassert orthodox Communist control
over events in Czechoslovakia took the form of a series of
bilateral and multilateral meetings, backed up by sustained
propaganda offensives and provocative troop movements, all
designed to intimidate the Czech leadership and to persuade
them to abandon their reform program. From the beginning
there existed a strong presumption that the Russians might be
tempted to deal with the Czech problem by military means
.
To quote a Soviet spokesman:
"In the event of appeals for help from 'faithful Com-
munists' in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet army would be
ready to do its duty." [18]
The first political confrontation between the Czech leadership
and the Soviet Union, and those of her allies uneasy about
Czech developments (Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria)
took place at Dresden on March 23, 1968. (Rumania was not
invited.) The Czech delegation admitted that the allies'
concern over events in Czechoslovakia was understandable, but
the communique issued after the meeting was devoted to the
organization of the Warsaw Pact and related economic affairs.
In April, 1968 the Czechs published their "Action Program"
and Dubcek visited Moscow to explain it to the Russians, who
declared they had no intention of intervening in Czech affairs.
However, after Dubcek 's departure, Polish, East German,
Hungarian and Bulgarian representatives met in the Soviet
capitol to study the "Program's" implications. The next major
confrontation occurred when Soviet Premier Kosygin visited
130

Czechoslovakia at the same time that senior Soviet officers
were in Prague to discuss a strengthening of cooperation within
the framework of the Warsaw Treaty, After a period of pole-
mics between the Soviet Union, her sympathizers, and Czecho-
slovakia, Czechoslovakia's critics gathered in Warsaw on July
15, 196 8 and sent a strongly worded letter to the Czech leader-
ship demanding resumption of full Party control. At the end
of July, amid mounting military and political tension, the
Czech and Soviet Politburos met at the border town of Cierna-
nad-Tisou and discussed the issues between them in secrecy for
three days. After the Cierna meeting, the Czechs announced
their intention to meet with the signators of the "Warsaw
Letter" at Bratislava on August 3rd, and to sign a joint dec-
laration reaffirming Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Warsaw
Pact. Czech statements after the Bratislava meeting exuded
confidence and it looked as though the Russians had agreed to
a compromise authorizing the continuation of the Czech liberal-
ization program. In Dubcek's own words, the Cierna and Bratis-
lava meetings had "opened up new possibilities for the revival
process in Czechoslovakia." The Czech leadership proceeded
with their reform measures which included the publication of
liberal Party statutes to be discussed at the Czech Party
Congress on Sept. 9th. Dubcek received Rumania's President
Ceausescu, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, and East Germany First
Secretary Walter Ulbricht in the second week of August, with
the appearance of a statesman who had just pulled off a
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successful coup. Three days after the last visits, Soviet,
Polish and Hungarian armies with representative contingents
from Bulgaria and probably East Germany crossed the Czecho-
slovakian frontier. The nightmare of "dominoes" falling all
over Europe had been too much for the Soviet Union.
Two points immediately stand out about this series of
political confrontations between the Soviet Union, her four
allies and Czechoslovakia: (1) No meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact was called to deal
with the crisis; and (2) the really important sessions were
bilateral meetings between the Russians and the Czechs, (Mos-
cow in May, Prague in June and Cierna in July) . The multi-
lateral meetings at Dresden and Bratislava were much less
significant and more ceremonial. [20] Although the WTO was
referred to extensively at the Dresden, Bratislava and War-
saw meetings, none were held as a meetings of the Pact, and
none made use of Pact arrangements or machinery. (The PCC
could not have been used as an instrument of discussion and
negotiation in the Czech crisis once the Soviet Union had
decided to exclude Rumania from the collective meetings on the
Czech situation.) The inference to be drawn is that the
Warsaw Pact was not found to be a suitable organization through
which to deal with attempts to restore the orthodox Communist
foundations of one of its members. Clearly, the Soviet Union
preferred to hold "ad-hoc" meetings restricted to her sympa-




her four allies as appropriate and relying for effect on mount-
ing pressure from threatening military deployments. (The con-
trast with the NATO council procedures could hardly be more
striking.)
The Soviet action against Czechoslovakia was a frightening
tribute to Soviet military power and also to the grotesque
morality of Communist ideology. It is important to distinguish
the Czech case from the Rumanian case. (Internal authority vs.
independence in foreign and domestic affairs.) The Rumanians
did not challenge the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism, did not
seek to "humanize," "revise," or "liberalize" Communism and
hence posed little threat to the legitimacy and stability of
the Soviet system. [21] By resorting to military occupation
of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets signified their determination
to maintain their social and political order in the traditional
"great power" sense.
The subjugation of Czechoslovakia signalled a new era in
the relationship between Moscow and the East European states,
a phase in which the security and the national interests of X
the Soviet Union were given unambiguously high priority in
Soviet calculations. The purpose and usefulness of the Pact
in the Soviet view basically had not changed, despite a shifting
emphasis on organization and structure. The Soviet Union still
needed the Warsaw Pact for the transmission of political and
military directives to her East European allies and coordinat-
ing East European support for Soviet foreign and intrabloc
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policy. The Soviets, though, had hoped that the Warsaw Pact
would be a form of insurance against effective innovations by
leaders of the East European Communist Party. In this they
were certainly mistaken.
Following the Czech invasion, Moscow reassessed Warsaw
Pact functions and resolved to give the East Europeans more
consultative privileges but the result had been directed con-
sultatives and not a genuine counciliar system. Before the
Czech invasion, the countries of East Europe could be grouped
into four general categories in reference to their relation-
ship with the Soviet Union: (1) Yugoslavia, an independent,
"neutralist," and "non-aligned" Communist state that exercised
complete sovereignty in domestic and foreign policy, and was
totally outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization; (2) Albania,
an independent, anti-Soviet, anti-revisionist Communist state,
ideologically allied to the Chinese; (3) the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany,
which were client states of the Soviet Union; and (4) Rumania,
a dissident and non-cooperative member of the Warsaw Pact, a
neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and quasi-independent in
its foreign policy. After the Czech invasion, Yugoslavia,
Rumania and Albania were further alienated from the Bloc,
Czechoslovakia was returned to vassalage, and Poland, East
Germany and Hungary were forced to a position of greater
dependence on the Soviet Union. [22] The Soviet brand of
Communism had been irrevocably associated with Russian and
Soviet imperialism, domination and control. This has formed
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a barrier to acceptance, assimilation, and adaptation to the
Soviet system in the traditionally anti-Russian countries,
and has had some negative effects in the pro-Russian countries.
By intervening in Czech affairs, the Soviet Union had reached
a crossroads in its relationship with Eastern Europe. Before
the Czech crisis, the Soviet position in Eastern Europe had
been clearly slipping in response to nationalist pressures
and a lessening of the external threat. [23] In the post-
Czech era, Soviet policy has been designed to promote a greater
integration in Eastern Europe, as a means of restoring Soviet
control and forestalling a revival of reform Communism.
Confronted with disarray in its East European relations,
the Soviet government had no alternative but to ensure that
the original requirements, for which the Warsaw Pact had come
to fulfill, be maintained by tightening Party orthodoxy. The
Soviet interpretation of what was needed in Eastern Europe
would have to be accepted by all Party leaderships. For this
purpose, the Soviet leaders laid down the "Brezhnev Doctrine"
19
on limited sovereignty for Communist countries. The
Brezhnev Doctrine maintained that a Communist country has a
right to self-determination only so far as this does not
jeopardize the interests of other states of the "Socialist
Commonwealth," that each Communist party is responsible to
the other fraternal parties, as well as to its own people,
and that the sovereignty of each country is not "abstract,"




19One month before the Pact armies occupied Czechoslovakia,
the heads of state of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland,
Hungary and Bulgaria issued a letter (the Warsaw Letter) to
the leaders of the Czech Communist Party, warning that Czecho-
slovakia could maintain its independence and sovereignty only
as a member of the Socialist community. Shortly after the
invasion, the World Communist leaders received their first
lecture justifying the Soviet action. In the September 26,
1968 issue of Pravda Soviet Party ideologist Sergei Kovalev
explained that each Communist Party is responsible not only to
its own people, but to all Socialist countries. Thus, if the
gains of Socialism are endangered in one country, the Socialist
community as a whole has the right to eliminate the danger.
On October 3rd, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced
at the United Nations that the Socialist states could not and
would not allow a situation where the vital interests of
Socialism are infringed upon, and encroachments are made on
the inviolability of the boundaries of the Socialist Common-
wealth. This statement quite clearly defined the Soviet atti-
tude toward traditional international relations. It appeared
to be a Soviet axion that the traditional principles did not
apply to relations between the fraternal nations of the Socialist
bloc. In a speech to the 5th Congress of the Polish United
Worker's Party on November 12, 196 8, Brezhnev enumerated these
principles as they governed the cooperations of bloc members.
The fundamentals of the Doctrine, which the Polish Worker's
Congress declaration have been associated with Brezhnev's
name are
:
"There is no doubt that the peoples of the Socialist
countries and the Communist Parties have, and must
have the freedom to determine their country's path
of development. However, any decision of theirs
must damage neither Socialism in their own country,
nor the fundamental interest of any other Socialist
countries . . . This means that every Communist Party
is responsible not only to its own people but also
to all the Socialist countries and to the entire
Communist movement."
Since the initial enunciation of the Doctrine, its inter-
pretation occupied a central role in political studies in-
side the bloc. Soviet theorists have taken great pains to
prove that the axion is a Leninist legacy, also that inter-
national law which regulates relations among Socialist states
goes beyond general international law. It should be noted
that the Soviet Union has never formally admitted the exist-




Soviet Union reserved the right to define each country's
sovereignty.
In following up the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet govern-
ment first secured the legal right to garrison troops in
Czechoslovakia, (5 Soviet divisions are currently positioned
on Czech soil, comprising the Central Group of Forces), under
a treaty signed October 4th, 1968. The most significant fac-
tor of the group's deployment is that it was not positioned
to strengthen the defense of Czechoslovakia against NATO or
West Germany. No Soviet formations were stationed on the West
German frontier. Rather, the divisions were deployed in cen-
tral Czechoslovakia, within striking distance of the main
cities; Prague, Bratislava, Olomone, Brno, and Ostrava, and
arranged so that they divided the country in two, cutting off
Bohemia and Moravia from Slovakia. This deployment was clearly
designed to maintain internal security and to monitor the
loyalty of the Czech armed forces and police, whose reliability
and morale left much to be desired in the Soviet view.
Simultaneously, the Warsaw Pact signatories plunged into
an intensive round of national and multinational exercises,
high-level military conferences and inspections. There is
little doubt that Pact authorities were anxious to resiome the
training programs interrupted by the invasion, and to draw
the Czechoslovak armed forces back into the fold. There was
also a tightening of discipline as well as an effort to keep /'




Politically, the Brezhnev Doctrine provided the background
for the unrelenting pressure which the Soviet Union brought
against Dubcek and his colleagues after their anguishing
negotiations in Moscow between August 23rd and 2 6th. This
pressure led to the removal of Dubcek as First Party Secretary
on April 17, 1969, and his replacement by Gustav Husak, who
was more likely to be an uncritical supporter of all Soviet
demands on his Party and State. [2 6]
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces may have
solved the short-term problem by putting a stop to the unre-
stricted phase of the Dubcek liberal experiment and returning
the country to the control of the orthodox Communists, but it
left unsolved the pre-crisis disagreement over the rights and
privileges of the non-Soviet members of the Pact and the role
of the Pact as a forum for genuine discussion and debate. The
main legacy of the crisis as far as the Warsaw Pact was con-
cerned is that Czechoslovakia, once one of the few genuinely
pro-Soviet, moreover, pro-Russian countries in Eastern Europe,
was imbued with feelings of distrust and disillusionment which
would not be easily overcome. The main Czech criticism leveled
at the Soviet Union was that the Soviet leadership had resorted
to armed invasion as a means of solving the political differ-
ences between them, because they were unable to produce valid
political arguments to support their case. The invasion did
more than any other Soviet action to confirm the Czechoslovaks




their own country and possibly for the other Communist countries
in Eastern Europe. The Czechs continue to believe that the
Soviets had nothing but superior force on their side in August
1968, and that this did not provide a "proper" basis for an
alliance between equals with vital interests in common. [27]
Once the Soviet Union had settled the Czechoslovak crisis
through occupation of the country, the Soviet leadership turned
to the task of reorganizing the Pact in order to eliminate some
of the national resentments which had obviously contributed to
the Pact's turbulent history. The Political Consultative Com-
mittee of the Pact was convened in Budapest in March 1969, just
P six months after the invasion, to give formal approval to docu-
ments presumably worked out in detail beforehand in Moscow,
(the meeting lasted only two hours) , which authorized reorganiza-
Ition of the Pact's military structure. The communique issued
after the meeting indicated that a Committee of Defense Minis-
ters of the Pact and a Military Council would be established to
advise the Pact's Commander-in-Chief, and that Senior East
European officers would henceforth be appointed to the Pact's
Command. The Committee of Defense Ministers was to meet at
regular intervals to review and approve the decisions made by
the other, lesser body, the Military Council. (However, one
source stated that the Committee proposals would have to be
submitted to some unspecified "appropriate authority" for
approval.) The Military Council, though, patterned after the
Military Councils which exist at various high levels throughout
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the Soviet armed forces and which control the activities of
arms of Service, military districts and fleets, was the real
innovation of the 1969 Budapest reforms. Forming a Warsaw
Pact Military Council meant that the East European countries
would have greater access to discussion of Warsaw Pact policy,
if not actual decision making. In Soviet terms, this reform
represented a significant concession to the East European
allies, and for the East Europeans, it was a substantial im-
provement over the situation which existed prior to 1968.
As noted in chapter 3, the Budapest reforms did not give
the Warsaw Pact High Command a real command-and-control func-
tion, and there was no indication that the Warsaw Pact Head-
quarters or the Warsaw Pact Staff would have any operations,
signals, transportation or supply services which would enable
the Pact to function with an independent HQ in wartime. Also,
the responsibility for air defense remained with the Soviet
Air Defense Command. This implied that air defense was to
remain outside the Pact's authority, and that the Soviet
Union's air defense frontier would lie along the western borders
of the East European states, each country, in effect, an air
defense district of the Soviet Union. As suggested, the post-
1968 Budapest reforms did not really enhance the WTO's wartime
role. The Pact, as a military organization whose purpose and
usefulness in Soviet eyes had not basically changed, remained ./
an administrative headquarters within the Soviet Ministry of
Defense, designed to rationalize and coordinate East European
resources, training and defense policy. There was clearly no
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I"Warsaw Pact" military doctrine distinguishable from that of
the Soviet Union.
With regard to enhancing Pact unity in the political sphere,
the PCC, meeting in Bucharest in November 1976, created a new
political institution for the alliance. According to the of-
ficial communique, the Pact "adopted a resolution" to create
an organ of the PCC, a Committee of Foreign Ministers, (CFM)
,
with an associated secretariat. The CFM was to be a standing
committee charged with working out recommendations on foreign
policy questions. Actually, a standing commission with an
associated secretariat had existed since the first PCC meeting
in 1956, but according to Soviet sources, these organs had not
functioned in 21 years. In any event, as a result of the
Bucharest meeting. Pact Foreign Ministers, who had in the past
met infrequently, began meeting annually in 1977. Little is
known of the work of the CFM secretariat, which is headquartered
in Moscow, other than that it is staffed by representatives
from various Warsaw Pact states, and that it handles adminis-
trative matters and implements decisions taken by the CFM.
These reforms, however, did provide the Pact with the same
continuity in the political sphere that the Budapest reforms
had achieved in the military sphere. [28]
In the post-Czech era, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has
evolved into a complex effort to promote cohesion through a
comprehensive integrationist policy at every level. With its
own powerful armed forces and through the Warsaw Pact its
control over the Eastern European armed forces, with the /
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Iinvasion of Czechoslovakia as a harsh reminder of Soviet
willingness to impose, by force if necessary, orthodoxy, and
with the Brezhnev Doctrine as its ideological support, the
Soviet leadership embarked on a comprehensive policy designed
to create an atmosphere in which the circumstances which led
to the Czech invasion would no longer arise.
Economic integration was still an essential part of the
Soviet Union's effort to "perfect" its mechanisms for control
over East Europe. In this, of course, the Brezhnev leadership
was continuing the policy begun by Khrushchev. But whereas
Khrushchev sought integration from above, through a supra-
national planning body, and failed, Brezhnev sought it from
below, "from the bottom up," through a system interlocking
the basic elements of the Eastern European economics with each
other and principally, with the Soviet Union. This was a
multi-faceted, long-range program, which was started with an
agreement among several East European governments, including
Rumania, to invest in Soviet raw-material industries following
the publication in 1971 of the "Comprehensive Program" for
integration and the agreement to an overall plan of coopera-
tion effective from 1976, outside the individual national
plans of member states. Whereas economic integration (through
CMEA) had referred to the Soviet Union's efforts to exploit
its East European allies' strength and potential, this new
concept of integration was intended, presumably, to make




Though economic integration was reemphasized as an essen-
tial part of the Soviet leadership's plan for cohesion within
the East European bloc, its new concept of integration went
much further. In the post-Czech era there has been far greater
stress on political, cultural, ideological, and (as discussed),
military integration. The Soviet Union resolved to consult
more with its allies, trying to make the Soviet-East European
relationship one in which direct pressure was much less needed,
but unfortunately the result had been essentially "directed"
consultation. On the surface, the Soviet method of consulta-
tion with its allies may appear to be a genuine counciliar
system, an appearance strengthened by the fact that many of the
various meetings are held in East European cities and are pre-
sided over by East European officials. Though this is con-
sultation, it is not joint consultation; the inequality of
partners is accepted and both discussion and decision proceed
on this basis. This does not deny that "heated" discussion
does not take place. Rumania has clearly balked at many at-
tempts to reach a consensus on issues they oppose, so, too,
have Hungarian delegates put forward specific points of view
at variance with the Soviet Union. [30] In matters of lesser
importance, the Soviets have allowed themselves to be dissuaded
from their original views, but on subjects of vital concern to
Soviet leadership, the consensus has been directed.
As an example of continuing Soviet hypocrisy in its re-
lations with the Warsaw Pact countries, despite the post-Czech
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Ireforms, I would like to cite the record of East European
participation in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks
(MBFR) . Since the 1950 's the Soviet Union and her WTO allies
have spoken of the necessity for arms reduction in vague propa-
gandistic terms and the West has replied in kind. However, in
June, 1968, the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers issued a
declaration suggesting talks with the Soviet Union and the
other WTO countries for the purpose of mutually reducing their
armed forces in a balanced and substantial way. The talks were
convened in Vienna and continue, but they have yielded scant
progress. What is significant is the manner and form of non-
Soviet WTO participation.
It was clear from the beginning that within the Warsaw
Pact, the Soviet Union would, as always, make the major
decisions. The talks only gained momentum after May, 1970,
when Brezhnev, in a speech at Tiflis, Georgia, suggested the
possibility of talks on arms reduction, but even then the
first plenary session of the Preparatory Consultations was not
held until three years later. Rumania though, had wanted the
opportunity to participate with equal rights both at the pre-
liminary discussions as well as at the negotiations. The
Soviet Union, however, decided to exclude not only Rumania,
but Hungary as well from full negotiating status. Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany and Poland were given full status while
Rumania had to settle for observer status, together with Bul-
garia and Hungary. Thus, while all the WTO members were
nominally participating, the Soviets had created subgroupings
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within the negotiations. It was clear though, as the negotia-
tions progressed, that the "main say" was left to Moscow and
that the three full status members had only a limited role in
policy formation, while the "observers" made no perceptible
input. The MBFR negotiations, therefore, showed Moscow's
increased sophistication in the use of the WTO to convey an
image of polycentrism while effectively maintaining central
control. [31]
The processes of the Brezhnev leadership, aimed at creat-
ing a new kind of cohesion between the Soviet Union and the
East European states , have been the main Soviet preoccupation
P in the post-Czech era. The brilliance of Brezhnev's approach
is its "grass-roots" orientation; fashioning a cohesion so
pervasive that it creates its own viability. But essential
to this cohesion is public stability, a truism the Soviet and
East European ruling elites have frequently been taught through-
out the turbulent history of recent Soviet-East European
relations. No sooner had orthodoxy been restored in Czecho-
slovakia, than "workers" riots broke out in Poland in De-
cember, 1970. This upheaval not only led to a change of l
leadership in Poland, but also sent tremors of renewed un-
certainty throughout East Europe. The Polish workers were
mollified by a number of important material concessions which
attempted to raise considerably the worker's standard of
living. As for the rest of Eastern Europe, the desperate
actions in Poland gave an impetus to other governments, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, to incorporate "consumerism" as a basic
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part of their economic policies. In the GDR it had, in fact,
become entrenched before the Polish upheavals. It was also
implicit in the Hungarian "New Economic Mechanism" , and be-
came a basic part of the Husak regime's "normalization" policy
in Czechoslovakia. Unlike the "goulash" Communism of the
Khrushchev economic policy, economic consumerism was pursued
*in an effort to increase viability in Eastern Europe without
fundamental institutional change. [32] However, the failure
of this policy through the decade of the 1970 's to achieve a
reasonable standard of living for the East Europeans is at
the heart of the more recent Polish crisis.
The unaltered reality of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
has not been successfully masked by the Brezhnev integration-
ist schemes. The inability of the Soviet Union to accept the
East European allies as independent, sovereign states in the
political, economic and military spheres dooms any initiative
they may take at creating viable relationships in Eastern
Europe. As we have seen, within the framework and limitations
of the Soviet concepts of defense and military strategy, the
WTO performs useful political and military functions. Through
it, the military manpower, skills and resources of the East
European countries have been rationally utilized to help ful-
fill Soviet defense requirements. The fundamental weakness
of the Pact in political terms is summed up by the fact that
Soviet armed forces have been repeatedly used in action against
their Warsaw Treaty allies: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in
1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 — and action in Poland was
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ft only narrowly avoided in 1956, 1970, and possibly 1980. The
H hard fact of life for the Soviet leaders is that they must
^r always regard the populations of their allies as potentially
I unreliable, so that they can neither rely fully on their multi-
lateral institutions nor, in particular, admit their East





The WTO is very much a Soviet creature, though an organiza-
tional infant with respect to classic alliance theory. Never-
theless, it has evolved (see Figure 5.1) greatly from the
dormant paper organization of the 1950 's to one with important
military and political roles. Polycentrism, economic growth,
interbloc relations, arms control, detente and European sec-
urity have all shaped the evolution of the Pact. Changes, then,
have come from both internal and external pressures, of which
the Sino-Soviet split, Rumanian dissidence, Czech liberalism ^
and the Helsinki accords are but representative examples. Des-
pite the many problems Soviet decision makers face in con-
structing a satisfactory relationship with their East European
allies, the WTO nonetheless is a vital element in that long
term process. The role of the Warsaw Pact, in the Soviet view,
has not basically changed in the past 25 years. The Soviet
Union still needs the Pact as a conduit to transmit military,
political and ideological imperatives to its East European
allies. Militarily, it serves to administer the East European
armed forces, acting as an extension of the Soviet Ministry of
Defense. Politically, it has evolved toward a forum for
presentation of East European views, though the Soviets have
exerted the primacy of their own interests at the expense of
inter-alliance cordiality. The Pact has been most effective
at harnessing the military resources of Eastern Europe to the


















































































































































































































































































































Pact brings some benefits to the smaller East European coun-
tries; it relieves them of the burden of individual defense
and places them under the nuclear umbrella of the super-
powers; and it provides their armed forces with up-to-date ^
weapons (Fig. 5.2), which they might not otherwise be able to
afford.
However, the Warsaw Pact, as it has evolved, represents a
fundamental, possibly unresolvable set of contradictions.
This problem stems from the Soviet insistence upon incorporat-
ing in one organization arrangements relating to the vital
security interests of the Soviet state, and a political struc-
ture designed to promote bloc solidarity and unanimous support
for Soviet foreign policy views, while simultaneously attempt-
ing to present the Pact to the world as a classical alliance,
or at least an East European forum with which the West can
conduct meaningful negotiations on European security (CSME)
and arms control (MBFR) . The fact of the matter is that a
classical alliance between sovereign states cannot satisfy the
requirements of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The pros-
pect of allowing the East European countries to participate in
a meaningful way in military, political or economic affairs
is, at the present, inadmissible. The dilemma facing the
Soviets is that, as long as the Warsaw Pact is a military/
political administrative organization tied to Soviet institu-
tions, it cannot become a classical alliance of equals in the
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Itoward becoming such an alliance, or at least a genuine forum y
of East European opinion, the Soviets will be faced with con-
tinued discontent, dissent and revolt. A solution will in-
volve either a return to bilateral operations (as has happened
in each crisis situation) , or a resort to a massive subjuga-
tion reminiscent of Stalin's treatment of the problem. Whether
Soviet imperatives can ever be reconciled or harmonized through
a system that discounts general East European views and does
not take into account the variety and diversity of needs and
aspirations of the region is a matter of great doubt. Internal
autonomy directly challenges the ideological base of the Soviet
system and thus the internal security of the Soviet State,
while independence in foreign policy matters erodes Soviet
power in world affairs and constitutes a challenge to external
Soviet ideological aims. The Soviets continue to face an
arduous rear-guard action against the forces of disintegration,
and it is not far-fetched to speculate that the concept of
"polycentrism, " rather than falling on the "rubbish heap of
history," may accurately depict future trends. As time goes
on, the ideological base binding East European Communist
states will continue to erode, difficulties will arise from
the breakdown of cooperation within the Soviet system and the
ensuing hardships will certainly lead to mass discontent. The
countries of Eastern Europe are likely to become more "European"




LContinuation of the Soviet integrationist drive in East-
ern Europe will also depend on the Brezhnev succession in the
Soviet Union. If a serious struggle ensues: (1) Soviet
authority could decline throughout Eastern Europe; (2) uncer-
tainty could produce a revival or factionalism in some
East European leaderships; (3) leaderships could again begin
orienting their policies along more national lines; (4) intra-
East European groupings could begin to form; and (5) some
states could seek closer economic ties with the West. A Soviet
succession crisis could thus have profound consequences for
Soviet-East European/Warsaw Pact relations. If there was a
protracted succession crisis, then it would be difficult to
see how the infrastructure of integration, which Brezhnev has
so carefully built in the post-Czech era, would survive the
reemergence of those centrifugal forces which, though latent,
have not yet been eradicated. Brezhnev's infrastructure is
still far from complete and still too fragile. Not simply a
decade, but more like a whole generation or more of patient
un-
building will be needed to justify Soviet confidence in its
durability. Disintegrating forces could emerge on both the
domestic and national levels, serious friction between the
Soviet Union and its East European allies could come to the
point of renewed military intervention. The new leaders who
emerge from the succession period will have to begin again
designing a system that recombines the Soviet imperative of
cohesion and the East European need for viability.
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Prospects for the immediate future are for a further in-
tensification of Soviet integrationist policies. With the
present Soviet leadership, attempts to further impose ortho-
dox conformity and closer control over East European economic,
military, foreign policy and ideological areas is likely to
increase. Despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact was born of
Moscow's Cold War strategies, it has acquired real substance
largely in relation to the achievement of the above goals.
Under multiple pressures, the Soviet attitude toward the War-
saw Pact has become more complex, but the need to upgrade the
Pact as an instrument through which Soviet power can be mani-
fested is a process with much continuity. In the words of
one Soviet author:
"The development of cooperation, including of military
cooperation, of the countries of Socialism, is based
on the fact that they have a uniform ideology, i.e.,
the Marxist-Leninist concept, and a common goal,
namely the building of Communist society and its
defense against the feeble impulses of internal and
external counter-revolutions." [1]
Although laced with some ambiguity, this is perhaps as clear
a statement of the principle Cif not always the practice)
underlying the Warsaw Pact.
To a great extent. Western analysts "mirror image" the
Warsaw Pact in terms of NATO. (In the introduction I warned
against such a practice, and hoped to illustrate the basic
distinction between the WTO and a classic alliance.) All
alliances are phenomena of international politics; as such,
they are transactions or agreements for the achievement of
specific objects. (Most alliances are concerned first and
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foremost with defense outlays, not only on the technological
and logistical plane, but also through the implications of these
matters for strategic and political planning.) They are al-
ways "against" som.eone or some thing and are formed out of the
adoption of a common stand in an international conflict
situation. [2] Specifically, an alliance refers to the rela-
tionship between two or more states which includes:
a. collaboration with one another for a period of limited
duration, regarding a militarily perceived problem,
b. an aggregation of their capabilities for participation
in international affairs,
c. pursuit of national interests jointly , with parallel
courses of action,
d. probability that assistance will be rendered by mem-
bers to one another. [3]
What distinguishes alliances from other forms and other expe-
riences in international cooperation, such as integration,
multinational community building, and economic partnership
are the presence of such factors as:
a. existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated
,
b. contemplation of risk of war
,
c. mutuality of interest in either preserving the status
quo or aggrandizement in regard to territory, population,
strategic resources, etc. I4J
o nA collective goods analysis of the Warsaw Pact assumes
that one of the purposes of the organization is that it serves
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the common interests of its members. In the general study of
alliances, this purpose is simply, security — the protection
of member states by the collectivity. More specifically, the
main purpose of an alliance such as NATO and presumably the
Warsaw Pact is "deterrence," the forestalling of aggression
against members of the organization. Harvey Starr, in his
article, "A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact After
Czechoslovakia" concludes that:
"... the value of the WTO and the relationship of its
members to the Soviet Union, as summarized by measures
of collective goods, appear not have been altered to
any extent by the events of August 1968." [6]
Harvey Starr is right to assert that Soviet policy in the Pact
reflects a great deal of continuity. The Soviet commitment
to the Pact as a multinational instrument for control is not
disputed. I would take exception with Starr over his first
basic assumption: that is, that the Warsaw Pact is an
alliance. By any of Friedman's definitions, the Pact under
Soviet tutelage is a gross departure from the criteria set
forth. The "common interests" in the Warsaw Pact are Soviet
interests, be they the preservation of the gains of Socialism
or the furtherance of World revolution. The individual con-
cerns, needs and aspirations of the East European countries
20
A "Collective Goods" framework deals directly with the
purposes, functions and benefits of organizations. This ap-
proach was originally developed by Marcus Olsen and has been




are of little concern to the Soviets, unless dissent and re-
volt threaten Soviet security. The Warsaw Pact is certainly
not an alliance in the classic sense; if anything, it repre-
sents a perverse Soviet attempt to legitimize imperialist
tendencies.
But for all our Western criticism, the Pact is a "Soviet"
alliance, and should be viewed with this caveat in mind. The
essence of the WTO, according to Soviet commentators, derives
from the "community of Socialist States," a "new" kind of
international system, (one in which the Soviets reserve the
right to define each actor's limits of sovereignty) based on
mutual aid and eschewing all forms of exploitation, whether of
its own members or of other political actors. This glowing
version was portrayed, for example, in a speech by Brezhnev
as late as December, 1975. The Socialist Community, he
affirmed,
"
... is a voluntary alliance of equal , sovereign, and
independent states, which, being Socialist ones, draw
for strength and well-being only on the free work of
their peoples, knowing no exploitation at home and
not exploiting the labor or riches of other countries
or peoples." [7J
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky goes so far as to argue that the
WTO essentially differs from all past coalitions, and from
military and political blocs presently linking the imperialist
countries. He bases his claim on five main propositions





Proposition 1. The WTO is a "voluntary" organization,




Proposition 2. The WTO is based on the principle of
total equality of participants.
Proposition 3. The "alliance" of the Socialist coun-
tries is a genuinely defensive organization.
Proposition 4. Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact is not a
narrow, closed military organization.
Proposition 5. Unlike NATO, troops of the Warsaw Pact
continue to be directly subordinate to the national
commands, attesting to the mutual respect for sovereignty
of allied commands.
Although Marshal Yakubovsky ' s propositions are interesting, I
would like the reader to reflect on the history of Soviet
policy in the Warsaw Pact to judge just how diluted one's
understanding becomes when encased in Marxist-Leninist ideology.
If the Soviets tend to think in terms of a Socialist Utopia
based on dialectic principles without regard for the stark,
often harsh reality of the present, then I suggest Yakubovsky 's
view of the Pact is almost the best example I could cite.
The Warsaw Pact is certainly not an alliance in the classic.
Western sense. The common interests of the member states are
not pursued or maximized through collective efforts, the
security of the East European states are more threatened by
their Russian mentor than they ever were threatened by Western P
Europe, NATO or the United States. The Pact is rather a '<^ ' (^^
"Delian League," an immoral institution imposed on the ^ (l
countries of Eastern Europe by an aggressive, imperialist
Soviet State for the purpose of shielding themselves from a
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continued Western threat. The Pact, though it loses credibil-
ity on a theoretical plane, does, however, present a signif-
icant military capability. Whether the Soviets would use the
Pact in an aggressive fashion is strictly conjecture. Of all
the aspects of the WTO, though, the most significant is that it
has enabled the Soviets, through the East European armed forces,
to maintain its dominance in a region which is historically,
strategically, and ideologically vital to Soviet State interests
21
The Delian League was a confederacy of Greek states under
the leadership of Athens, headquartered at Delos, established
in 478-477 B.C. after the initial repulse of the Persians from
Greece. It was dissolved in 404, when Athens capitulated to
Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War.
Thucydides briefly lays out the original organization of
the League in his book. The Peloponnesian War . All Greeks were
invited to join with Athens m a confederacy against future
Persian incursions. The Athenians were to supply the com-
manders-in-chief, who would preside over meetings of the League
to discuss policy. These meetings were to be held at Delos,
(hence the name Delian League) and there in the Temple of Apollo
the treasury was to he kept. Simple oaths of loyalty were
taken by the allies to Athens and to the alliance. The autonomy
of the members was assumed rather than made explicit.
However, as Athens increased in power and wealth, the League
came under Athenian dominance. The Athenians moved the treas-
ury from Delos to Athens, using these resources to further their
interests. By the end of the war with Persia, the League,
dominated by Athens , became an acknowledged Athenian empire
.
The allies' independence was seriously undermined, and tribute
collection was tightened. Though these measures were unpopular
among the allies, Athens refused to compromise. Various revolts
broke out and were suppressed. Finally, when Samos revolted in
440 B.C. Athens entered into the Peloponnesian War (431-4 04)
,
which imposed serious strains on the alliance. The Athenians
demanded increased tribute to finance the War and increased
military support to replace their own losses. The revolt of
the Mytilene, crushed in 428-427 B.C., marked the apex of the
Athenian degeneracy. Other areas of the empire remained rela-
tively secure until the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily
(413 B.C.). After the Sicilian disaster, revolt spread more




It is relevant to note that Athens was a rising power,
with a dynamic concept of purpose, and was compelled to act
(in the Peloponnesian War) for security imperatives. The
story of Athens and the League is one of ethics vs. expediency
and the corruptive influence of power and of war. I leave it
to the reader to reflect on the lessons of Athens and the





IMK WARSAW IKIiAlY Ol' FRIl^NDSHIP, CO-OPERAl ION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
Bcuveeii ilic People's Republic of Albania, the
People's Republic ol Bulgaria, the Hungarian
People's Republic, the (jerman Deinocralic
Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the
Ruiiiaiuaii People's Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak
Republic.
The contracting parties,
RealVuining their desire for the organization
of a sNstein of collective security in Europe,
with the participation of all the European
stales, irrespective of their social and Mate
systems, which would make it possible to
combine their efforts in the interests of securing
peace in Europe,
Taking into consideration .it the same time
the situation obtaining in Europe, as the result
of ratification of the Pans agreements, which
provide for the formation of a new military
grouping in the shape of 'Western European
Union' together with a remilitarized Western
Germany and for the integration of Western
Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which
increases the threat of another war and creates
a menace to the national security of the peace-
loving states.
Convinced that, under thcbc circumstances,
the peace-loving states of Europe should take
the necessary measures for safe-guarding their
security, and in the interests of maintaining peace
in Europe,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charier.
In the interests of further strengthening and
promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual
assistance, in accordance with the principles of
respect for the independence and sovereignty of
states, and also with the principle of non-inter-
ference ill their internal alTairs,
Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance
and have appointed as their authorized repre-
scntativcs:
The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the
People's Republic of Albania - Vlehmct Shehu,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
People's Republic of Albania,
The Presidium of the People's Assembly of
the People's Republic of Bulgaria - Vulko
Chervcnkov, Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,
The Presidiunj of the Hungarian People's
Republic, Aiulias Hegedus, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's
Republic,
The President of the German Democratic
Republic - Oito Grotewohl, Prime Minister of
the German Democratic Republic,
The State Council of the Polish People's
Republic - Jozef Cyrankicwicz, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers o( the Polish People's
Republic,
The Presidium of the Grand National As-
sembly of the Rumanian People's Republic
-
Gheorghc Ghcorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's
Republic,
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Nikolai
Alexandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the
Council ol Ministers of the USSR,
The President of the Czechoslovak Republic -
Viliain Siroky, Prime Minister of the Czecho-
slovak Republic,
Who, having presented their credentials, found
to be executed in due form and in complete
order, have agreed on the following:
Article I
The contracting parties undertake, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations
Organization, to refrain in their international
relations front the threat or use of force, and. to
settle their international disputes by peaceful
means so as not to endanger international peace
and security.
Article 2
The coiuracting parties declare their readiness
to take part, in the spirit of sincere co-operation,
in all international uiulcrt.ikings intended to
safeguard international peace and security and
they shall use all their energies for the realization
of these aims.
Moreover, the contracting parties shall work
for the adoption, in agreement with other states
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desiring io co-operate in lliis nialtcr, ofefTcctive
incasuiob iDwaids a gcncial ledticiKin of arma-
ments and prolubitioa of atomic, hydrogen and
oilier \sta|)ons of mass destruction.
Article 3
The contracting parties shall take council
among themselves on all important international
questions relating to their common interests,
guided by the interests of ilrengihcnmg inter-
national peace and security.
They shall take council among themselves
immediately, whenever, in the opinion of any
of them, there has arisen the threat of an armed
attack on one or several states that are signa-
tories of the treaty, in the interests of organising
their joint defence and of upholding peace and
security.
Article 4
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on
one or several states that are signatories of the
treaty by any state or group of slates, each state
that is a party to this treaty shall in the exercise
of the right to individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations Organization,
render the state or states so attacked immediate
assistance, individually and in agreement with
other states that are parlies to this treaty, by
all the means it may consider necessary, including
the use of armed force. The states that are parties
to this treaty shall immediately take council
among themselves concerning the necessary
joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of
restoring and upholding international peace and
security.
In accordance with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations Organization, the Security
Council shall be advised of the measures taken
on the basis of the presery article. These measures
shall be adopted as soon as the Security Council
has taken the necessary measures for restoring
and upholding international peace and security.
which shall function on the basis of jointly
defined principles. They shall also take other
concerted measures necessary for strengthening
their defence capacity, in order to safeguard the
peaceful labour of their peoples, to guarantee
the inviolability of their frontiers and teiritorics
and to provide safeguards against possible
aggression.
Article 6
For the purpose of holding the consultations
provided for in the present treaty among the
states that are parties to the treaty, and for
the purpose of considering problems arising in
connection with the implementation of this
treaty, a political consultative committee shall
be formed in which each state that is a party to
this treaty shall be represented by a member of
the government, or any other specially appointed
representative.
The committee may form the auxiliary organs
for which the need may arise.
Article 7
The contracting parties undertake not to
participate in any coalition and alliances, and
not to conclude any agreements the purposes of
which would be at variance with those of the
present treaty.
The contracting parties declare that their
obligation under existing international treaties
are not at variance with the provisions of this
treaty.
Article 8
The contracting parties declare that they will
act in the spirit of friendship and co-operation
with the object of furthering the development of
and strengthening the economic and cultural
relations between ihem, adhering to the prin-
ciples of mutual respect for their independence
and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their
internal alTairs.
Article 5
The contracting parties have agreed on the
establishment of a joint command for their
armed forces, which shall be placed, by agree-
ment among these parties, under this command,
Article 9
The present Treaty is open to the accession of
other states - irrespective of their social and
state systems - which may express their readi-
ness to assist, through participation in the
162

present Treaty, in combining the efforts of the
peace-loving states for safeguarding the peace
and security of the peoples. This act of acceding
to the Treaty shall become elTectivc with the
consent of the stales which arc party to the
Treaty, after the instrument of accession has
been deposited with the Government of the
Polish People's Republic.
Article 10
The present Treaty is subject to ratification,
and the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Government of the Polish
People's Republic.
The Treaty shall take effect on the date on
which the last ratification instrument is depo-
sited. The Government of the Polish People's
Republic shall advise the other states that are
party to the Treaty of each ratification instru-
ment deposited with it.
Article ii
The present Treaty shall remain in force for
twenty years. For ihc conlracling parties which
will not have submitted to the Government of
the Polish People's Republic a statement de-
nouncing the Treaty a year before the expiration
of its term, it shall remain in force throughout
the following ten years.
In the event of the organization of a system of
collective security in Europe, and the conclusion
of a general European Treaty of collective
security to that end, which the contracting
parties shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the
present Treaty shall cease to be effective on the
date the general European Treaty comes into
force.
Source: Malcolm Mackintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact
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The system of bi-lateral treaties between the Warsaw Pact nations :
F — treaty for friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance ; T — troop
stationing treaty ; 1948/1967 — 1948 is the year the treaty was concluded,
1967 its year for renewal ; 1949 — year of dissolution of the treaty.
SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN BILATERAL TREATY SYSTEM
Source: Friedrich Wiener, The Armies of the Warsaw Pact
Nations
,
Trans. William J. Lewis, (Vienna:
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